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1. SUMMARY: This case has been straight-lined 
with No. 78-599, Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, and 
No. 78-1005, Brown v. Allen. It raises a question 
substantially identical to that in the other two cases: 
Whether Air Force regulations that require military 
personnel to obtain approval before circulating petitions 
on base are consistent with 10 U.S.C. § 1034 and the First 
'-:t' wov\d ~"AA1, 
c.,,J/)L -r~*') \? ~ 
,~~~- ~ 
a,..,,_~\ ... h .... ~ 
\ 
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Amendment. I recommend reading the cert memos in the --------------
following order: (1) Huff, (2) Glines, and (3) Allen. 
Thus, this memo should be read second. 
2. FACTS: Air Force regulations provide that 
"the public solicitation or collection oi signatures on 
a petition by any person within an Air Force facility or 
by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign country 
is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." 
Distribution of such material is prohibited if the com-
mander determines that "a, clear danger to the l oyalty, 
discipline, or morale of members o ed Forces, or 
material interference with the accomplishment of a military 
mission, would result." 
In 1974, while resp was on active duty as a captain 
in the Air Force Reserves, he drafted petitions to the 
Secretary of Defense and to several members of Congress 
opposing military hair length standards. The petition ~ 
somehow came to the notice of his superiors at Travis Air 
Force Base in California, and they informed him that on-base 
circulation was permitted only with approval of the base 
commander. Resp circulated the petition off-base. That same 
year resp was assigned, to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. 
There he gave the petitions to a sergeant who circulated them 
~ the base. Because permission had not been sought, resp 
was disciplined by being removed from active duty status. 
Cgj_ _ 
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Resp then filed this action, seeking reinstatement 
and back pay, alleging that the regulations violated the 
First Amendment and 10 U.S.C. § 1034: 
"No person may restrict any member 
of an armed force in communicating 
with a member of Congress, unless 
the communication is unlawful or 
violates a regulation necessary to 
the security of the United States." 
The district court on cross-motions for summary judgment 
struck down the regulations on their face as applied to 
non-combat zones. The court, relying exclusively on the 
First Amendment, found that the regulations suffered from 
overbreadth and imposed a considerable burden on the First 
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. Only 
in extraordinary circumstances, such as a combat zone or 
perhaps in an induction center, does the military have a 
demonstrable need for prior restraint. The court enjoined 
the Air Force from enforcing the regulations against resp, 
and ordered his reinstatement as well as $22,000 in back pay. 
The CA 9 affirmed in part and vacated and remanded 
in part. Relying on its earlier decision in 
Ailen(No. 78-1005) and the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Huff 
(No. 78-599), the court held that§ 1034 prohibits the ap-
plication of the prior approval requirement to the distribution 
of petitions to members of Congress at the Guam Air Base. Al-
though it was unsure of the precise nature of the Guam base, 
it did not think that allowing the petitions would be any more 
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disruptive to security than allowing the petitions at the 
combat-ready base in Huff. 
Because one of the petitions was addressed to 
the Secretary of Defense, the CA 9 was forced to reach the 
question of whether the prior approval requirement is con-
stitutional. It .found that it was not. Classing the re-
quirement as a prior restraint, the court concluded that the 
regulations were overbroad and that there was insufficient 
justification for them. Punishment after the fact for 
genuinely disruptive petitions is enough to protect the 
interests of the military. 
Despite holding the regulations unconstitutional, 
the CA 9 observed that monetary claims against the Government 
in excess of $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Court of Claim.so It therefore vacated the award of back 
pay and remanded to the district court for dismissal of that 
claim without prejudice or transfer to the Court of Claims. ~ 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG asks that this case be held I pending disposition of Huff. The response basically reiterates 
the reasoning of the CA 9 in this case and in Allen. Punish-
ment after the fact and the time, place, and manner restrictions 
approved in Allen are sufficient to protect the Government's 
interest. The protected interest is important, and the decisions 
below were clearly correct. Finally, there is no circuit conflict 
over the issue. 
- 5 -
4. DISCUSSION: Although there is no conflict 
there is also a substantial possibility, as the memo writer 
in Huff noted, that this issue may not be litigated much in 
the future. Thus, the fact that there is no circuit conflict 
is not as important as it sounds. 
If the Court is inclined to review the issue, it 
seems to me (contrary to the SG's conclusion) that this would 
be the case to take. In this case the First Amendment issue 
is more squarely presented because one of the petitions was 
addressed to the Secretary of Defense and not to Congress. 
'
. Thus, the judgment in this case extends to all petitions 
circulated on the base, no matter to whom they are addressed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 78-1006 
Harold R. Brown, Secretary of! 0 W . f c· . . h . . n nt o ert10ran to t e 
Defense, et al. , Pet1t10ners, U . d S C f A mte . tates ourt o p-
v. · peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Albert Edward Glines, · · .. 
[January - , 1980] 
MR. J USTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves challenges to United States Air Force 
regulations that require members of the service to obtain ap-
proval from their commanders before circulating petitions on 
Air .Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations 
violate the First Amendment. The second question is 
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions 
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which 
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to 
communicate with a Member of Congress. 
1I 
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force person-
nel have the right to petition Meinbers of Congress and other 
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) . The regu-
lations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force 
facility '' and "any •(Air Force] member . . . in uniform or . .. 
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition 
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate 
commander. Ibid.1 They also provide that "[n]o member 
1 Air Force Reg. 30- 1 (9) (1971) provides: 
"Righi of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and 

















BROWN v. GLINES 
of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written 
material ... within any Air Force installation without per-
mission of the commander .... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) (1) (1970). The comman<ler can deny permission only 
if he determines that distribution of the material would re-
sult in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale 
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mission ... !' Id., 35-
15 (3) (a) (2).2 
petition the Prcsidrnt, the Congress or other public official,::. However, 
the ~olicitation or collection of signature,; on a petition within an Air 
Forcl' facility or by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign 
countrr is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." 
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides: 
"( l) No member of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed 
or written material other than publications of an official government 
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation with-
ont permission of the commander or hi;; designee. A copy of the ma-
terial with a proposed 1>lan or method of distribution or posting will be 
8ubmitted when permi:,;:,;ion is requested. Distribution of publications and 
other materials through the United States mail or through official outlet::;, 
such as military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this 
regulation. 
"(2) When prior approval for distribution or posting h; required, the 
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, di,:cipline, or 
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mii,sion, would re,,mlt. If such a deter-
mination is made, distribution or po:,;ting will be prohibited and HQ 
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances. 
" (3) Mere po:;,gei,sion of makrials unauthorized for distribution or post-
ing may not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such 
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes 
or posts or attempts to distribute or post such material within the instal-
bt1on. Impounded materials will be returned to the owner when depart-
ing the in~tallation unles, determined to be evidence of a crime. 
'' ( 4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the ground 
that ( he material is critical of Government policies or officials. 
" ( 5) ln general, installation commanders should encourage and promote 
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media 
which present a wide range of viewpoiuti-; on public issues." 
78-1006-OPINION 
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves. 
While on 8/ctive duty at the Travis Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress 
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air 
Force's grooming standards.3 Aware that he needed com-
mand approval in order to solicit signatures within a base, 
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. Dur-
ing a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force 
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air 
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base com-
mander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before mili-
tary authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines' 
commander promptly removed him from active duty, deter-
mined that he had failed to meet the professional standards 
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby re-
serves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that 
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the 
, circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and 
1 10 U. S. C. § 1034.1 The court granted Glines' motion for 
summary judgment and declared the regulations facially in-
valid. 401 F . Supp. 127 (1975).0 
s The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read: 
"Dear Secretary of Defense: 
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Serv. 
ices of our nation, n•queot your assistance in changing the grooming stand-
ards of the United States Air Force. 
"We feel that the present rt•gulations on grooming have caused more 
racial tension, decr('ase in morale and retention, and loss of respect for 
authority than any other official Air Force poliC'y. 
"'\Ve are similarly prtitioning Senator Cranston, Senator Tunney, Senator 
Jackson, and Congre~sma,n Moss in the hope that one of our elected or 
appointed official:; will help correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F. 
2d 675,677, n. 1 (CA9 1978) . 
1 4 Glines named as defendants three of his superior officers, the Secretary 
' of the Air Force, and the Secretary of Dcfen8e. 
5 The District Court also awarded Cline,; backpa.y and ordered him 
restored to active service. 401 F . Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The 
,. 
.• 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).G Fol-
lowing its decision in an earlier case involving collective peti-
tions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that 
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034.7 ·· The statute 
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's com-
munication with Congress "unless the communication is un-
lawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of 
the United States." The Air Force regulations against 
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the stat-
utory standard, the court concluded, because the Government 
had not shown that such restraints 011 servicemen in Guam 
were necessary to the national. security. Id., at 679. Since 
s 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of De-
fense, the court next considered whether the regulations vio-
lated the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that 
requirements of military discip1ine could justify otherwise 
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that 
the Air Force regulations are ui1eonstitutionally overbroad 
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually 
Court of Ap])ea!s aff.rrned the reinstatement order, but it vacated the 
backpay awr,rd on the ground that all monetary claims aga.inst the United 
States for more than $10,000 are witbin the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court of Claims. 586 F. 2d, at 681-682. Neit11er is~ue is before this 
Court. 
6 The Court of Appeab held that Glines was not requirrd to exhaust 
his administrative remedies by seeking relief from t1ie Air Force Board 
for the Corrrc1ion of Military Records . The court found that Glines' claim 
involved statutory and ronstitutional matters over which the Board had 
no jurisdiction. Id., at 678. Smee the peiitioners expre:;sly declined to 
raise the rxha11stion issue in this Court, Pet. for Cert. 6, n. 2, error in the 
Court of AppPals ' m;oh1tion of the issue would not affect 011r jurisdiction . 
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) . 
7 The Court of Appeals' decision and the di:;cussion of this issue appea1• 
in its opinion in Allen v. Monger, 583 F. 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978). 
(:ert. pending sub norn. Brown v. Allen, No. 78--1005, 
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all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such re-
strictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to 
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 
- U.S. - (1978), and we now reverse. 
II 
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JUSTICE 
8'rEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitu-
tion ... disables a military commander from acting to avert 
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." 
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political lit-
erature on a military base challenged an Army regulation 
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at 
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that 
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint 
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized 
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of mate-
rial that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness 
of his troops. See id., at 837- 839. We therefore sustailled 
the Army regulation. Id., at 840. For the same reasons, we 
now uphold the Air Force regulations. 
These regulations, like the Anny regulation in Spock, pro. 
tect a substantial government interest umelated to the sup-
pression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a 
specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 ( 1974). Military personnel must 
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. 
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing 
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services 
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without 
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 
U. . 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Poree v. 
Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 367- 368 (1976) . 
·. 
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"'Spcecll tJ1at is protected iu the civil populatio11 may 
underrnillc the eff Pctiveness of response to command.'" 
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest, 
21 U. S. C'. M. A. 564. 570. 45 C'. M. R. 338. 344 (1972). 
Thus, whik members of the military services are entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment. "tlw different char-
acter of th0 military com1uu11ity and the military mission re-
quires a clifferellt application of those protections." Parker 
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield 
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline 
and duty .... ' " Id., at 744. quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 
U. S. 1:11, 140 (H)53) (plurality opinio11).8 Speech likely to 
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effective-
ness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock, 
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BrRGEH, C. J., concurring); id., 
at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the 
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reason-
ably necessary to protect the substantial governmental in-
terest. , ee Procimier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army 
and the Air Force rPgulations implement the policy set forth 
in Department, of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (196~)).9 
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's 
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible, 
consistent with good order and discipline and the national se-
curity." J,d., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services 
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of 
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to mili-
tary loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air ~..,orce Reg. 35-15 (3) 
8 See Emer,-;on, Toward n, General Thc'ory of the Fir,-;t Amendment, 72 
Yale L . .f. 877, 935-936 (1936); Tnrell, Petitioning ActivitieH on :VIilitary 
Base~: Tlw Fin,t Amendment Batlle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5-14 
(1979) . 
9 Tlw Nav? regulation:, adopted pursuant to Deparlmen1 of Defcn~e 
(DOD) Directive 1325.fl (19fl9) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v, 
Huff, No. 78-599, wlncl1 we also decide toqay, 
18-1006-OPINION 
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(a)(2); Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir. 
1325.6, iT III (A)( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifi-
cally prevent commanders from halting the distribution of ma-
terials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air 
Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 ,TIU (A) 
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no 
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines 
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post ex-
change newstands. Air .Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a)(l); see 
DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,r III (A) (l).10 Nor may they interfere 
with the " [ d] istribution of publications and other materials 
through the United States mail. ... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 
(3) (a) (1). The Air Force regulations also require any com-
mander who preveuts the circulation of materials within his 
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Force Reg. 
35-15 (3) (a)(2); see Army Reg. 210-10, TI 5- 5 ( d). Spock 
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military 
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840; 
id., at 848 (POWELL, J. , concurring). · 
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members 
of the military services to secure command approval before 
circulating written materials within a military base is not 
invalid on its face. Id. , at 840.11 Without the opportunity to 
10 The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Deparl-
ment of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of 
particular i~sues of a commercial publication. Anny Reg. 210--10, ir 5-5 
(c), (d) (1970) . That part of the Army regulations wa~ not ai, i;;sue in 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,832, n. 2 (1976) . The Air Force regulations 
contain no such proviRion. 
11 Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in 
that efL8f' were civilians who had no 8pf'cific l'ight to enter a. military base. 
The distinction is unpersuasive . Our decision in Spock rf'jre1 ed a facial 
challenge to n re>gulation that require>d "any person ," civilian or military, 
lo obtain prior permiHHion for the distribution of literature within a base. 
Id .. at 831. Unauthorized di:stributions of literature by military person-
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review materials before th0y are dispersed throughout his 
base, a military commander could not avert possible disrup-
tio11s among his troops. , ince a commander is charged with 
maintaini11g morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have 
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect 
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military 
force.12 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command 
depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability 
of [hisl subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of sub-
ordinates depends upon the unquestioned st)ecific and custom-
ary reliability of the superior." Deparbnent of the' Air Force 
v. Rose, 425 F , ., at 368. Becaus<' the right to command 
tributions b~· riv1hnn~. Fmthrrmorr, thr military lrns grrni<'r authori1y 
owr n servicrrnnn than ov<'r a eivilinn. Sre Pa1'ker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 7:33, 
749-751 (1974) . Ewn wlH•n not confronted with thr HJWeiaJ requirements 
of thr militar~·. Wf' hnvr hrld that a govrrnmentnl <'mploy<'r may ~ubjrct 
it,- rmployPrS to ,;urh ~reeinl mstrictiom: on free Pxpres~ion n~ are r<'aHon-
nuly nrcP~sar~· to promote pffrrt1v<' government. S<'C' Civil SPnnce Cumm'n 
v. Letter C'an·frrs. 41:3 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); Cu/e v. Richardson, 405 
U.S. 676, fi84 (Hl72) ; c-f. Kell<'!/ v. Johnson, 425 lT. S. 2:{8, 245-248 (197G). 
12 The spre1,tl dangpr:,; prf'srnt in rertain militarr i::ituation,- may warrant 
clilfrrrnt restnetion$ on the rights of :,;rrvicPmrn. But tho~e rr:;trictions 
necr,-~ary for thr 111ru!cat10n and mamtemrnce of ba,-1c di,-ciplinr and pre-
parrdness arr as ju:;tifif'd on a rrg11l:tr lntse in tllC' l111ited Stairs. Schne£cler 
v. Laird, 45;1 F. 2d 345 (CAlO) (per c-uriarn), cert .. denird, 407 U.S. 914 
(1972) ; Dash v. Comma1u7ing General. 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969), 
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cNt. demed, 401 U. S. 9 1 
(1971), as on a trainmg ba~P, Greer v. Spuck. supra, or a C'ombat-rendy 
ins1allation m the Pacifir, Carlson v. Schlesing<'r, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 
:325. 511 F. 2d 1:327 (1975) . J,o~·alty, morale, and discipli1w are e;:;sential 
attribute;:; of all military :,;ervice. Combat service obv10usly rrquire,- them. 
And membrr,- of thr armf'd i::nvices, wherever thf'~· arp as:,;1µ;11Pd, may be 
tr:-rnsfrrred to combat dut~· or ra!led to drnl with civil d1,-;ord<'r or natur.il 
d1sa:,;ter . SmeP tlw 11nor approvnl requirement :,;upport~ <'ommandrr:-;' 
authorit)· to maintam bn:,;ic cli:,;e1pline rrquired at near!~· <'V<'r~· military 
irn,tallation, it does not off!'11cl the First Am!'ndment. ''Tiu:,; Comt 
hail ..• rrpPatecU~· t'xprps:,;<'d Its reluctance to strikl' down a :,;tat ute on its 
faef' where thrre rare] n :-mbstantinl number of :,ituation" to which it 
~rnght he validly applied." f!lrker v. Levy, Stt1)/'n, at 760. 
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and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this 
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess 
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g., 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re 
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial 
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander 
to determine before distribution whether particular ma-
terials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops.13 
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical m pur-
pose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock. 
"\Ve therefore conclude that they do not violate the First 
Amendment. 
II 
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. . C. 
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command 
approval for the circulation within a military base of petitions 
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "ln]o person 
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicat-
ing with a member of Congress, unless the communication is 
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of 
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends 
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions 
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We 
find his contention unpersuasive. 
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in re-
sponse to a specific and limited problem. While Congress 
13 Commanders sometimes may apply the><e regulation~ ''JrratiuuaJly, 111-
vidiou:,ly, or arbitrarily," thm; giving ri::;e to !Pgitimate claim:, under the 
First Amendment. Gree,r Y. Spock, 424 U. S., at 840. But Glme::;, who-
like the civilian:, in Spuck-never rrque,;ted permIB:,10n to eircnlate lus 
matnial«, has not and cannot rai::;e ::;uch a rlaim. !bid.; id., at 849 
(POWBLL1 J ., COIJClll'l'ing) 
' . 
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was debating the Act. Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin 
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge 
from the Navy "had been told by his commanding officer •.• 
that a direct communication with his Congressman was 
prohibited and ·[that] it would make him subject to court-
martial." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). When the Congress-
man made inquiry about the regulations imposing this 
restriction. the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they 
required "any letter from a member of the naval service ..• 
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment ..• 
'[to] be sent through official channels." lbid.14 The Con-
gressman then proposed an amendment to the pending mili-
tary legislation that would outlaw this requirement. 
Congressman Byrnes' purpose w:as "to 1,ennit any man who 
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write 
to his Congressman or Se11ator." lbid.rn The entire legis-
lative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue 
for the communication of individual grievances. The Chair-
H The relrv,111t. N:w? rrgulntion actually -irnposrd restrictions on "f a.]ll 
petitions, rrrnonstrances. memorials nnd communications from nny 11erson 
or pcr:,;on~ in the naval service . . .. " Navy Rrgs .. art. 1:248 (1948)'. 
Glines argues that Congrrss intruded to remove nll restrict1011s impo8rd by 
the rrgulation, including thosr on collectivr as wrll ai, ind1vicbwl petition-
ing. But tlw plain lnnguagr of ~ 1034 refleets no snch intention. Indeed, 
nothing in tlH' legislativr bi;;tory sugge;;ts that Congrc::;s even was aware 
of thr foll ~copr of thr r-iav~· regulation. 
15 The origirntl proposal pro1 ected any person from induc1ion into a 
branch of the armed forcrs that rrstricted the "rights of 11 s members to 
communicate direct]~, with J\,kmbrrH of Congrrs~ . ... " 97 Cong. Rec.· 
3776 (1951) . After the Clwirman of the Armed Service~ Committee 
pointed out t.ha l the Nnv~1 did not induct its mrmbrrs, ibid., tlrn proposal 
was amended to substantial!~- i1~ present form, id., nt 3877, 3883. Uni-
versal Militar:v Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144, 
§ 1 (cl), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified 
in HJ56 . Act of Aug. 10, 195(-i, Pub. L. 102k, ch. 1041, 70A St111.. 80. No 
change in substanee wa~ intended. See S. I~ep. No. 2484, 84th Goug., 2c1· 
Bess., 95-9(-i, Hl-21 (195(-i) ; H. R Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,. 
85, 8-10 (1955). 
•' , .. 
'· 
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man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized 
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was 
Intended "to let every man in the armed services have the 
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any sub-
ject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with 
some secret matter.'' Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that 
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual mem-
ber of the armed services could write to his elected represen-
tatives without sending his communication through official 
channels.16 
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special 
character of the military requires civilian authorities to ac-
cord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with 
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g., 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at 
49-51 (POWELL, J., coucurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. 8. 83, 93-94 
(1953).17 In construing a statute that touches on such 1natters, 
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the au-
thority of military commanders to an extent never intended 
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. 
D. C. 26, -, 575 F. 2d 907, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, No. 78-599. 
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to 
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves 
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endan-
gering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good 
10 Section 1034 1otands in ma.rked contrast to an analogou:-; ~tatute en-
acted about 40 year:; ea,rlier in order to guarantee frderal civil ::;ervants 
the right t.o petition Congrrss. That statute provides : "The right of 
employres, individually or collectively, to petition Congre::;;; or a Mem-
ber of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congre:;:;, or 
to a. committee or Member tlwreof, may not be interfered with or denied." 
5 U. S. C. § 7211. (Empha~1~ added .) 
17 See also Curry v. Secretary of the Anny, -- U. S App. D . C. -, 
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order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of col-
lective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legisla-
tive purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and 
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result. 18 We 
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of 
collective petitions within a military base. 
IV 
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10 
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring mem-
bers of the service to secure approval from the base com-
mander before distributing petitions within a military base . . 
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are 
not invalid on their face. Accorqingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
18 Glines says DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,rIII (G) shows that the Department 
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, how-
ever, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative hi8tory. 
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Milita.ry .Tustice, art. 138, 10 
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to 
complain and request redress of grievance:; against action;, of their com-
mander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 10:H for the statement that "a 
member may petition or present any grievance to any member of Con-
gress . ... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26, 
-, 575 F. 2d 907, 913 (1978), rev'd, No. 78-599, the court concluded 
that this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But 
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demon-
strate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directive· 
otherwi:se. See s'upra, at 6-7 , and n. 9. 
d , 
'· 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.  
Since an affirmancc on statutory grounds in Nos. 78-599 and 
78-1006 does not command a Court, it is appropriate to _4 L_ 
express my view on the constitutional questions presented. I ~~ 
believe that the military regulations at issue are prohibited by a<-. ~~ 
the First Amendment; accordingly, I would hold them to be ~ - ~ "',a::6:-t=t..... 
unconstitutional, and affirm the judgments of the two Courts A. -1~- ~- • _ _ 
1 
lh 
of Appeals. -  
Two sets of military regulations are challenged. Respond- ~ ~ 
ents in Huff (No. 78-599) attack Navy and Marine Corps 
regula.tions that require prior approval by commanding officers ; 
before the origination, distribution or circulation of petitions 1lu_ ~S ~ ~ 
or other written material on ships, aircraft, military installa- ~ ~ 
tions and "anywhere within a foreign country." FMFO k ,.,,,,~~~ 
5370.3. Respondent in Glines (No. 78-1006) challenges · -r; 
parallel Air Force regulations that require command approval l>f ~
before the distribution or posting of nonofficial printed mate- ~ . £J~ -~ 
rial and for the circulation of petitions for signature.1 AFR --.,- - 7 
~~~ 1 The Air Force regulations exempt from prior command approval the , 
distribution of published material "through the United States mail or S 1.--,._, 
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30-1 (9), 35-15 (3) (a). Both the Navy and Marine and the 
J\ir Force regulations authorize withholding of approval if the 
comrnancler determines that distribution "·oulcl pose a "clear 
dang0r" to loyalty, discipline or morale of servicemen or if 
the distribution would "materially interfere'' with military 
cluties.2 The Air Force regulation explicitly declares, how-
ever, that "[dlistribution or posting may not be prohibited 
solely on the ground that the material is critical of Govern-
nwnt policies or officials." (Rmphasis added.) ~ 
I 
Res11ondents contend that the regulation1, impcrmissihl:v 
interfrrp with First Amendm0nt rights to communicate ancl 
r)('tition. That contention finds solid support in First Amencl-
nlC'nt doctrine ns explicated in a variety of s0ttings by decisions 
of this C'onrt. These regulations plainly establish an 0ss0n-
tinlly discretionary rrgime of cenrnrshin that arbitrarily 
cknrive"' re<:ponclenfo of precious cornmunica tive rights. 
The circnlation of 11Ptitions is indisputably protected First 
,\ rnenrlrncnt activity. Petitioning involvrs a bundle of related 
First Amendment right-': the right to express idrns. SC<', e. g .. 
S!rect Y. Nrw York, ::\04 P. S. ,576. 593 (1969); Martin v. City 
of Struthers. 310 TT. 8. 141. 143 (1043). the rig·ht to be exposed 
to irl0ns C'-:pressecl by othNs. F><'0. P. g., Stanley v. acorgin, 094 
F. 8. fi57. 564 (1069) : Lamont Y. Postmaster GenPral. 3~1 
F. A. 301 (1963); 1·r1 .. ut ~08 (BRENNAN. J., conr11rrin[-!;): 
partrnrnt of Df'frn°r guirlrlinr~ arr 1 o t hr s:,rnr rfTrrt. DOD Dirrrtivr 
1~2.'Ui. 
2 In addition, thP Knvy nnd l\f:irinr Corp:- rPg11lntions hnr rirr11lation 
or m:itrrinl thnt advor:itrs inf;11hordinntion, disloy:i!tv, rnutinv, or clrsrr-
tion, thnt di~closrs rl:is,ifird information, th1t rontnins oh~rrnr mn1trr. 
or 1h:if, involves thr planning or 11nlawr111 nr1R. 
s A rmmterpnrt, to this clerhr1tion is thr sfntemrnt in DOD Directi,·r 
1~'.?.'5.fi. that "rtJhr fort th:11 a p11hlir:1tion is critirnl or Governrnrnt 
polirirs or offirinls is not, in it~rlf, n ground npon which distrib11tion rnnr 
hr prohibited." 
,, 
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l\fartin v. City of Struthers, s1,7Jra. at 143, the right to coin-
municatc ,:vith government. ser, e. (!., Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. R. 220, 23!'i (1963); rf. flaoue v. CJ(), 307 U . R. 
496, 313 (1939) (Roberts. J.). and the right to associatr ,vith 
others in the expression of opinion. i"C'C, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 TT. S. 1, 15 (1076); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169. JRl 
( 1072) ; N AJ CP v .• 1 lnbmna. 357 TT. 8. 449, 460 (19.18) .• 
Thr petition is especia11:v suitrrl for the rxrrcise of all of these 
riirhts: it serves as a vehicle of corn.munication; as a classic 
means of individua1 affiliation with ideas or opinions: and as 
a 1)('acdul yet effective nwthocl of n.inplifying the vic\\·s of the 
inclividunl signers. Indeed. thr prtition is n trnrlitionally 
ffff0r(>rl method of politicfll rxprrssion nnd participation. Rrr. 
e. (!., United StatPs "· rruil:shank, 9~ TT. S. M2, !'i52-553 
(187:'i); J. Rtory. C'omnwnbrirs on t],e Constitution of thr 
rnitrcl Statf's 619- 620 (Cooley rd .. rnn); cf. TVh:tr "· 
Nfrholls, 44 P. S. (3 IIo,Y.) 2R6, 280 (1845). Thns, prtition-
ing of officials has brrn f'"l)rPo:s]v hrld to hf' ,'l rir.i:ht r-::ecnrrd by 
thr First .'\mendmrnt. 0 Rrfr!r,r-: Y. C'alifnrnia. 314 TT. R. 252, 
277 (Hl41). 
T'his First ~'\meNln1 rnt i-hirld for prtitioninp: io: i111prr111ip,-
siblv hrc?chcd in nt lrnc:t thre0 wnvs lw thr rrgi1lntioni- bdorr 
118. 
First. By manclr:iing that prono"rrl prtitions hr ~uhif'rtrd 
t0 commnnrl apDr0Y[11. tlw rrgnbtionc; irnnnr-::c fl prior rrPtrni11t." 
• Tt may br thnt thr Prtition Clm1Pr, in Pornr rontrxtR. rnhnNC'H thr 
pro1rrtions of the Sprrrh C'lau,r. Tl1rrr i~ no nrrd. howrYrr. to r,plorr 
1hr di~tinctivr nttributrs of tl1r Prti1ion Cl:i1N' in thrPr raRC'', f0r con-
Yrntionnl First, Amr11dmrnt :1nnlY~i,; nrnpl)· Puffirr~ to dispo,r of thr 
ron~1 itutional i~;;nr,; prr~rntrd hrrr. 
~ Brrau8r tlrn petition s0 rffrrtivrh· promotrs n numhrr of Fir~t Amrnrl-
rnrnt, interests--'('~J)('riall~· 1 hoRr thn1 nrr n~sorin t ionnl in nn t11rr-prt i-
1 ioning is not mrrely fungiblr \\'i1 h ot hrr rxprr~~ivr nrt iYit ir~. 
6 The command approvnl requirrmrnt iR 1:!£1 sj~ 1!~· n "timr, pl:IC'C' nnd 
rn~ vnlirl nndrr 1hr First Amrndmrnt. Ser Polirr De-
tnrtment of Chicago v. ,lfoslc.,1. 4Qq U. S. 92, fl~ (]!)72). Thr ron,-·1 itu-
t ionnl to11rhstonr of prrmi~~ihlr I imc', plnrr, n net m:mnrr rrg1iln1 ion is 
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Sec Greer Y. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 865 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting) ; Smdheastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
r. R. 1546. fi52-553 (1075); T imes Fil?n Corp. v. Chicago, 
065 P. S. 43. 4.S-46 (H)61). Although the First Amend-
ment, bar against prior restraints is not absol_~~ l\Tebraska 
Press Assn. v. Shiart, 427 F. S. 539, 590 ()()76) 'f_l:3RENNAN, .J .. 
roncurring in judgment), the Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that tlH' prior ccnc:;orc:;hip of ex;)rcssion cnn be justified only by 
the moPt f'ornpr1ling goyrrnmental interests, i"ee. e. g., Ne-
braslrn Press Assn. v. Stirnrt, silpra , at .5n8- 5,59; New York 
Tim es ro. Y. fT11itC'd States , 408 1 . S. 7m. 714 (1971) (per 
ruriarn opinion); nrqan-iza11·on for a Better Austin v. Kerfe, 
402 TT. 8. 415, 4 Hl (1971): Rantnrn Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U. R . . 58, 70 (Hl63): !\Tear v. Minnesota , 283 lT. S. 607, 
71 -5-716 (1031 ). Thus far. onlv tl0 c intcrrst in avrrting a 
Yirtuall:v rrrtain proc::pect of imminent. severe in.iurv to tlw 
Nation in fonc of ,rnr lrns bC'rn genera1lv ronsicl r recl a s11ffi-
cir11tlv weighty gron'mi fnr prior rei::traint of ron~titutionallv 
protrf'ted spcech.1 See. r. g., J\.Tew York Tim es. 81/J)ra, at 726--
t hnt it focu~ 1111 011 t hr rir~mn~t:111rrs-not t hr co nt rnl of rxprr~,ion. 
Id., at 99. The militnry rC'gulntiom: in this rn ,::p-focinlly nncl nR np-
11lird-look to the' contrnt of petition~, n~ wrll :1, to thr rn:1m1C'I' in 
which thC'y nrC' circulntrd. 
7 To br surr, wr hnve upheld rr~t rnints dirrrterl againRt olwcrnity, 
Times Film Corp. "· Chicaao. supra, 36.5 U. R., nt 47--4/s, or again~t 
so-rnllrd "fighting worclH," Chaplinsky v. Nrw llampshire, 815 U. S. 568 
(19-~2). Such rC'strnintH have been prrmittecl on the theory 1hnt tlw cen-
sorC'd expresRion clors not rnjoy First Amendment protC'rtion. We lrnve 
nlwnys been cnrefnl to insist, however, tha1 rest riction ,:: nimecl n1 unpro-
1E'ctr<l speech br cnrdully crnfted nncl nppliC'd to avoid trC'l1ching upon 
communicntion that comes within thr nmhit of thr First Amc11clment. 
Sec, r. g., Freedman"· Maryland, supra. 
IL has also been ,::peculated ihat, the direct, immeclinte threat of inter-
ference with tho trial procc~,:: mighi, warrnnt a re,-tr::iint upon constitution-
nll:,· protected ex11res ion. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, nt 
569-,570 (dictum). But scr id., ::it 588, 594-505 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in judgment). Significnntly, howevrr, this Court has rcpcntrdly 
' I 
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727 (BRENNAN, J.); id ., at 730 (ST1~wAnT, J.). The instant 
r0guhtions, however. explicitly rNprire commanding officers 
to supprnss petitioning for reasons for less urg0 nt than immi-
nent, serio11s. peril to tlw Unitl'cl States or its citi7,ens. Th0 
maintenance of military clisciplinP. morale, and cfficicnrv me 
undeniably important, b11t they r1r0 not always, and in cvNy 
situation. to be regarded as rnon' compelling 1l1an a hoRt of 
other governmental interests " ·hich WC' lrn Yc found i11:_;:uffici0nt 
to m1rrnnt censorship. Ree. e.g., Kew Ynrk Times v. Unded 
Strrt<'s, su'nra: Tink<'r Y. DN; MninC's Sthnnl District. 393 F. S. 
fi03 (Hl69) ; :.,0c nlso Buckley ,,_ T'al<'n, supra. Moreover, 
tcrm-i as arnornhous [1S "di sci pl i nr" rn1 cl "morale" invite la ti-
tmlinnus intrrprrtation t]1at intolcrnblv clisaclvantagr:, thr 
0x0rcise nf First Amendment rights. Ser Procunir>r v. ]\,far-
tinez. 4Hi l~. S. 3%, 41?i-41G (1974). ; \ i:, these very casrs 
illnstratr . the 1wrcPi ,·Pcl thr0R( to di i:-ripli110 and morale ,yiJ1 
often corr01atr with thr rnrnrnanding officer's pC'rsonal or 
polifr•al hiai""'i.~ Sec p. 12. infrrr. 
8Pcor>d. Tlw rommand annrovnl proc·0clnrc implrrnrnt;11a; 
thr"P rPg11lations is :00ri0uslv flr Y;t" Ti7iw and 27ai11. 1h0 
<'oJJrt, has unckr:;:cor~ t1w nrinriP°t7 that r rstrnin t s unon rorn-
rr,irctcd efforts to wield thr jndirial rontcmpt powrr against rxprrs~ion 
1 J,at assrrtrdl:-· .i ropa rdizrr! 1 hr ndmini,.;1 r,1tinn nf ,i11~t irr Srr Landmark 
Communirotioirn, /n (' . , ·. T'irginio, 435 U. 8. H20, ~-11-R-l!i (197R): Wood v. 
Georgia, 370 U. S. 37-5 (l052): Craig Y. !Tam e?/. 331 U. S. 3fi7 (1947): 
Pe11nekamp Y. Florida, 32, U. R. 331 (104G); Bridges v. California, s11pra, 
314 U. S. 2.52. 
'Among thr f: 11 pprr~-:rd ('omrn1111irn t ion., "'rrc• a JH'I i1 ion to a Congrr~-mnn 
f-11pporting :1mnr"t)' for Yirtnmn 1Var rrsistcrs nnd a leaflet outlining 
rrrt:1in rei,pondrnts' views about, thr constitutional rights of servirrmen. 
Both WCI'(' ('(•n~orrd, the formrr brc:1t1~(' ii "conlainrPdl gro,;.~ misstn1r-
mrnts and implications of law and fort and impngn[rd] by inmwndo the 
motives and roncluct. of the Cornmandrr-in-Chid of thr Armrd Forcrs": 
thr lattrr bera u,.;c it was "by transparent. im11li rat ion, dis1wq1C'ctful and 
<·onkrnptuo11~ of all of yom ,uprriors .... " App., nt 45-47, 50, No. 78-500. 
Thr Government conceded brlow tlrnt Rupprrssion of the lranet w11R im-
proper under military regulntions. Govt. Brirf, nt, 8, n. 3. 
6 
7 -1006 & 7 -599-DISS"EXT 
BROWN v. GLIKES 
munication must be hedgerl about by procedures that gum·-
antee against infringement of protrrtrrl rxpres:::ion ancl that 
eliminate the play of discretion that epitomizes arbitrary 
censorship. See, e. g., Southeastern Promolions, Ltd. Y. Con-
rad, supra., at 558-562; Blount v. Rizzi, 400 lT. S. 410, 416--417 
(1971): Crirroll v. Commissioners of Princess Annr, 803 U. 8. 
17fi. 181 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (l9fin): 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, su7)ra, at 70-71 (]968): cf. 
SchnPider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). W0 have icl0ntificd 
:::nerific f'afeguards that arc inclispensablc if a system of prior 
apnroval is to avoid First Amendment pitfalls. These inC'ludr 
(1) the requirement that the bmdcn of justifyinp; censorship 
fa]l upon the censor. s0e ATew York Times Y. U11derl Stairs. 
s11pra. nt, 714; Freedman v. Marylanil, s1i7Jra, at 58, (2) tlw 
condition that administrative suppression mu"'t b0 subject to 
s1 0erlv imlicial review, ~cc Blount,·. Rizz1·, S?1pra, n.t 417. :rnrl 
on tlw rnle that tho'SP who~(' Fin,t Anwmlnwnt interests arr 
at -:tak<' be given notirc and an opportnnit_v to hr herml dminp; 
:::upnre::::::ion proC'eedings, f<C'C' Carroll v. Cor111nissio11crs of 
Princess Anne. suprn, at 181- !R~: rf. Procunfrr v. ]1,f art?'nc:z, 
s1mrn. at 417-419. 
Nnnc nf thef'0 s11feglH1rd1" ic:; present unclN thr prior rom-
mand anprova1 sclwmc. Thrrr is no indiC'ntion that thr 
burd0 n of j 11 Rtifyin,i; censorship rests upon thr n.11thoritieP. 
Nnt only do0s the commanding officer mnkr his own determi-
nation to su~)prrsR. but 110 pro2.-:i ~ is maclr fpr prompt .iudi-
rial rrYiew.0 And \\'(' srnrrh thrrcii;ulat ions in vmn for nnv 
nrovis'i~ ::iffording the right to ap1;car bdore the cen::;orin~ 
offirer to ar~U<' for apprm·n1. Tlrns. the r0~nlnti0ns uttrrly 
0 Tt, is unnPC'C'SRnr? to ronsidn whrt brr SC'n·irC'tnC'n mig:ht rhn liC'ng:C' 
rrn~or~hip dC'risions by bringing: s11its ngnin~t. ihC'ir rommnnrling ofnrC'r~. 
The lnr.k of provision for immC'rlinte ,i11rlirinl fC'YiC'w i~ noi rurrd by thC' 
poP;a;hility thnt, nn indiviclunl mig:ht l1$P11ffiC' !hr hmdrn of rommrnring n 
rollntrral nction. Cf. Blount v. Rizzi. supra, 400 U. S., nt 418. Morc-
onr, it is unlikely ns a prnctirnl mnt!C'r ilrnt. prr~ons 8C'1Yinl); nt SC'fl or 
on foreign soil will hnvC' rrnclr nrrrss to dcnnrstir frdC'rnl romts. 
r 
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fail to meet e\'cn the minimum procerlmal dictates of tliC' 
First Amendment; ratlwr. as designed. they countc>nance the 
arbitrary ancl nonnrutral supprrssion of communication by 
l)etition.10 
Third. Tlw regnlations clrmonsi rnbly clo not serv!l_ the mili-
tary interests offerecl as tlwir compelling juptification':""and for 
that reas~ alone Yiol:JtP the First Arncnclnwnt. If regulation 
of communir::ttiYe rightc:; is to hr .iuc:;tified by ::i comprlling 
governmcnfal interest, the rrg11btion must precisel71 further 
thnt interest; ,Yhrre constitutional rights arr at Rtakr. impor-
tant ends do not sustain mismntrlwd nwans. Srr 1Yebraskn 
Prfss Assn. "· Stuart, suprn, at M~- .167, 560; Prornnirr v. 
Mortinez. supra, at 4m. Tn this rrRprct, the r<'gulations h>re 
pbin1v founrlrr. The rnoi::t irnporhnt purpose that can he 
l) ('sitf'd for tlwm iR pr<'wntion of inritrrnent to military clis-
orr1<'r. But if the danri;rr of inritrmrnt necrssitat0s prior 
r]r.'lrancr of s0rvic0mrn's mrssrig:rs. it would be logical for the 
rnilitnrv to mandntc nr0rlrnrn nrf' of all messa9~<'s. whctlwr 
rirc11laterl bv nrtition or dissrrninf'ltrrl orally. Sinre oral cfo,_ 
r·1,ssion ic:; not sub.irrted to preliminary crn:::orship. rlonbt 11111st 
hr raisrd as to the 11rgenr" r111d thr f'ffirncy of r,:uch rrnsor:::hip 
wlwn communication iR bv petition. In other words. inaf'-
m1lf'h as the rontrnt of an ornl rommunication mny b0 idrn-
tica l to the content of a prtition. tlwrr iR no re::ir::on to single 
out nrtitions for :i content pr0rlf'nrnnrr rrqnirf'mrnt. 
The onlv mtional basis for rlif:nnrn1r treatment of pdition-
irnr anrl or.'.l] romrnuniration wm1ld hr the presenrr of son1 e 
10 .i\gnin : the fuct11nl hnckgro1md of I hr~r rn. e,; is instrurlive. Two re-
~ponctents individunlh· ~nbmitlrd :1 Pinglr lr:1net for nppro\'nl. Thr rom-
mnnding genernl denied 0ne re,pondrnt prrmission to di,-:trih11te thr 
le,,nrt. on basr, becn1Pr of i1, cti,-:rr,J)('r1 f11l mid "ron1rmptuou~" 1one. 
Thr snme officer prrmit1ed 1hr o1hrr rr~pondrnt to circulatr 1hr idrntirnl 
lrnflrt outside the mnin p:atr. App. 80, 50. No. 78-500. Siner thr on-
po~t / off-post distinrtion hnd not hrrn ron~idrred di~po~i(i\·r wi1h re~pect 
to other request,;,, $PC App. 44, 4o-47. No. 7R-590, it iH difficult to ictrnlif)' 
thr principle uncterlyinp: thr differing ctc,ci~ions nboul the lr:1Rel. 
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clanger veculiar to lhe process of 7>etitioni11g. But petitioning 
differs from simple verbal exprC'ssion Ollly in that it involver:a; 
an element of physical conduct. Insofar as that physical 
rlernent of the prtitioning process poses a greater threat of 
di~rnption than docs simple verbal expression, recoursc to 
content-neutral regulation of the time, p1acr, ancl mannrr of 
circulation is surelv an appropri.atr and s11fficicnt altcrnatiYc 
to suppr0ssion. Bv orclering- prior official review of the con-
tent of prtitions. thesC' regulations arc an cxcessivr r0sponse 
to any distinctive problems of petitioning. Even tlw moc:t 
impcrfant gov0rnnwnta1 purpose cannot ,iustifv a rrp-ulation 
that unduly burd0ns First Anwnclmrnt, lib0rtirs. Rrc Shdtnn 
V. 1'1tcker, 364 1T. 8. 479. 488-400 (] 960). 
IT 
All that the Court offers to palliate these fatal constitutional 
infirmiti"'s is a series of platituclrs about the special naturr nncl 
owrn·lwlming impo~ c~ of 1cilitary necPssity. 11 A11tC', at 
f>-6. 
Military ( or national) sc<'uritv is a wciq;htv intcrr:'1t, 11ot 
lrast of all becavsr nationa.J survival is an indi:-:pcnsablc con-
11 The Court, ante. at n. 11 , al~n ~urrgrsts th:it rurlnilmrnl of' Firsi 
Amrndmrnt frrrdoms mi<.rht hr wnrranled innsmurh a~ srrvirr prr~onnrl 
a re govrrnmrnt cmplo)·rr~. riling Ci1>il &.;·1,ice C2 mm'n , .. Lf ltl'r Ca:rriers, 
41.'3 U. S. fi..J.'l (1973). Tq.ill, do;j~i1r. Thr 11rrdicntr for 
upholding liberty rrst rictions a~ a condition of 11ublic rmplo:vmrnt must, 
at least in pnrt, be the Yoluntnrinr~s of thr deriRion to nrrrpl govrrn-
mrnt rmployrnent. At vnrious times, howPver, this rn11ntry has ind11ctrd 
ritizens into military srn·ice as a mnttrr of compul~ion. Morrovrr, nnlikr 
other employers, srrvirrmPn may nol frrrl~· rrRign 1hrir 11osts should lhr:v 
drC'ide io unburc!Pn ihr m~r]vp~ of rrHtraints upon tlwir frrrdmn of 
exprrssion. 
It is also noteworthy that the sintutory sehrme considerrcl in Letter 
C'arriers permitted employees to "1s]ign n politicnl prtition as an in-
dividual," Letter Carriers, supra, nt 577, n. 21, nnd eviclrnll~· further 
allowed the full pnnoply of prtitioning rights with resprct to prtilions 
addrrssrd to t hr Frdrral Gonrnmrnt, id., at 572-57 4, 587-588 (a11pr11dix). 
9 
dition of national libertieR. ['nilcd States v. Robel, 380 
F S. 258. 264 ( 1967). But tlie concept of military neces~ity 
is secluctivel:v broad, and has a dangerous plasticity. Because 
they invariably have thr visng<' of overriding importance. 
there is ahrnys a temptation to i 11 rnke security "n<'cessi ties" 
to justify an rncroachmen t upon civil liberties. For that rea-
son, the military security argument must he approached \\·ith 
a healthy skepticiRn,: its vory gravity connsels that comts be 
cautious ,Ylwn military nrcessity is invoked by tbe Govorn-
nwnt to justify a trespass on Fir,;1 .\monclment rights. 
Such skoptir·i,-m lay at the henrt of our decision in iY<'w 
York Times v. United Stales , suprrr. Thore, the Govrrnment 
urged that Jwhlication of tho Ro-en llod Pentagon Papers \\'Oulcl 
damago tho Nation's security cl11ri11g n. period of armed con flirt. 
We rejrctod that assertion. 4m TT. 8 .. at 714. 8Pparate 
opinions srrutinized the security argument, and declined to 
rrly merely llpon tho GovNnmrnt's rharacteri,mtion of the 
interest at stako. 403 r. S. 7]!)-720 (Black J.); id .. at 722-
724 (Dou~laR. ,T.): id., at 726- 727 (Dm~NNAN, J.); id., at 730 
(S-rBWATl'r, .J.); id .. at 731. 733 (WHTTE. J.). Similarly, 
United Slat('s Y. Robel, su'f)ra, at 26~-264, spurned sirnplo 
deference to "taliPmanic incant::dio11fsl" of" 'war powrr.'" 
Analogously, wo have stringently viowcd the national f'e>curity 
::irgumont ,..-J1<,11 it h::ic;; brr>n proffered to suriport domestic 
warrantloc:s smvcillancc. United 8/atrs v. Unded States Dis-
trirt Court, 407 U. S. '.207. 320 ( 1072). 
To he suro, gPnera]s and aclmirnls. not fcdcrnl judges, aro 
expert aho11t military needs. Bllt it is eqnally trne that 
.irniges, not military officrrs. possoss the competence and 
anthority l0 interpret and apply tho First Amendment. Moro-
over, in tho context of this casr, the oxpcrtise of military 
officials is. to a great degrco, tainted by the natural self-interest 
that in,,vitalilv influences their exorciso of the power to control 
exprrssion. Partiality mu Rt bo rxpoctrcl when government 
authoritirs crnsor the Yie,Ys of snbordinatos. especially if those 
10 
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views are critical of the censors. Larger, but vaguely defined . 
interests in discipline or military efficiency may all too easily 
become identified with officials' personal or bureaucratic pref-
erences. This Court abdicates its responsibility to safegiiarcl 
free rxprcssion when it reflexively bows bdore the shibb_Qletl1 
of military necessity. Cf. La-;:;-;J;wrlc Communications, Jnr.~'-
Yirg1:nia. 435 U.S. 829, 842-84r5 (1978). 
A nronerly detached--rather than u2,1dul.z accruif§cent-
npproach to the military necessity argmnent here wonlrl 
rlonbtlrss hove ]eel the C'ourt to a different result. The mili-
tarv's 0111.isl"ion to rrgnlat0 tllC' cont·ent of oral communication 
s11ggrsts th0 pointlei'snri"s of controlling th0 identical messagr 
v:lwn rmboclied in a nctition. It is further troub1ing that 
thrsr rezulatio118 appl:v to all military bases. not merely to 
those that operate unclcr combat or nenr-combrit conclitionR. 
Tlw "front 1il1P" and the rear erhe1on mav be clifficnlt to 
irlentlfy in tho conditions of modern warfare. bnt thrrc is fl 
clifferrnre hetwcrn an encarnpJY\ent that faces imminPnt con-
flict :rnd a military installation th::it nrovid0s staging. s11pport. 
or training services. It is simply impossible to credit the 
ronkntion tlrnt national sr:-cnrit~.r is significantly promoted hv 
the control of petitioning througho11t all installations. 
Finally. and fundamentally. thr C'ourt has been cleludcd i11to 
1111(JUCi:'tiOning; acccptancr of th~vrry 1la,vf'd a'-Sl;;nption that 
cliscipli1w and morale ar0 enhanced by restricting peacrful 
communiration of various -viewpoints. Properlv regulatrd as 
to time. place. and manner. petitioning provides a useful 0t1tlrt 
for airing complaints and opinions that are helcl as P.trongly 
hv cit1z0ns in uniform as hy th0 rest of society. The forcrd 
f!bSC'llf'f' of peaceful expression only creates the illusion of 
g0od orrler; undf'rlying disE>rnsion remains to flow in to thC' 
rnorP dangnous channel:" of incitcmrnt and disobedience. In 
tlwt Sf'DSC', military 0fficiC'ncy is only disserved when Firi"t 
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The C'ourt cF egiously errs in holding that Greer v. Spock, 
424 U. S. 828 (1976), compels the validation of these reg11la-
tio11s. I dissented in Greer, ancl continue to disagree with the 
decision in that case. But, in any <'VC'nt. Greer is not clisposi- 1 
tive here; incleed, if it governs at all in these cases. Greer is 
a11thority that the rrgulations arr constitutionally indPfrnsible. 
Greer arose bccanse of th<' r<'.irction by military authoriti<'s 
of Dr. Benjamin Spock's rrqu0st to hold a presidential Cflrn-
paign meeting and distribute ram11aign literature at Fort Dix. 
Although tllC' case involVC'd a nurnlwr of Army re11;111ations 
rrstrictinr.; vnrious expre1-siv0 flrtivities-including regulations 
par::1llel to those b 0 forp 11s 11ow--th0 actnr l issuC' in Greer \Y2S 
thr rxclmiion of a politieallv parti1-nn campaign pffort. And 
t1,f'rr wer0 thrre critical rlcnH'nts in GrC'er that promptPd thr 
C'onrt to snstain th; t exclusion : ... . 
First, the C'ourt rrlircl upon the proposition that civilians 
ln.ek cxprcssiYC rights on militRrv reservation<: from wl1ich 
thf'v can bf' r,cluclccl. Si1l'nificantlv. the previous clrcision in 
Flower v. United States, 4-07 F. S. H)7 (1972) (per curinm). 
,Yns distinguil"hecl on the ground thnt leaflettin~ in Flower had 
t:ikcn place on a portion of Fort Rnrn TTonston tlrnt hnd lwrn 
rffrrtivelv rlPdicntecl to public usr. 
Second, the C'omt, notrd that srrvicernen stationrd at Fort 
Dix had C'nsv uccesc;, to off-husr p11blir forn where tl1rv could be 
exposed to ~omrnunfc:"ations by Dr. Sno~ and other~. Bv the 
snrne token. although not discusRrrl in Greer, thesr off-bnic:r 
forn provided Dr. Spock with nrnpl0 opportunity for exnreP-
sivc activity. Tims, from tlw stnmlpoint of speaker and lis-
tenrrs, the Fort Dix regu1ations only effrctecl a partial cutoff 
of commm1icativc rights brcausr othrr eq11ival0nt awnucs of 
interchange remained oprn. 
Finally, Greer repcaterll:v rrnphasized the lack of any claim 
that the Fort Dix rC'gnlntiom: had bern applied in bia,:ed 
fashion. It explicitly not0d the con,plcte absence of any 
' . 
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q11estion of "irrationa rlJ. in Yi cl imi [ s l, or arbitrar[ y l" app li-
ca tion of the Arm_v rer:nlations. 424 U. S., at 840. Accord-
ingly, the Court did not confront thr problem of official dis-
crimination among political viC'wpoints. Indeed, Greer placed 
, ·eight 11pon a perceived "Am.erican constitutional trnclition" 
that the military bo institutionnll,v free of political entangl<'-
ment. and that it avoid "the appC'arance of acting as a hnncl-
maiden for partisan politiral caus<'s or candidates." Id .. at 
s::m. 
These thrcr predicateo: to Greer are wholly absent in th<' 
P-etting in whfrh we review the regulation ::; before us. ~ 
their facr, and as ap.J_)lied in these Ct:!S<'S, the regulations 
r0sfncf the <'"Xprcssive activities of individuals who arC' man-
rla torily, not pPrmiF'sivrly, present on militarv reservatwi1S. 
For soldiers and sailors, as oppo<Jrd to civilians, military] 
in c:-tallations must be the pbce for "frer ... corn.munication 
of tllomrhts," GrePr v. Spock, supra, at 8~8. Furthrr, whPn 1 
sen·ic<' p<'rsonnel are stationed ahroad or at sea. the basp or 
"·nrshin is wry likely the 011111 place for frep commurncation 
of thrrn~hts. 12 Thus, in contrast to Greer, the rcgnlationR her0 
p0rmit c0mpk•te foreclosurr of a distinctive mode of rxnres-
sion by :oervicc1nr'n, \Yho lark th<' civilipl 's outiop to clr-p::irt 
th0 snhNe of military a11thorit:v. 
These casPs also diffn from Grepr bPCflllPe they <'X<'rnplify 
p0rvasive official partialitv in the regufotion of rncs.snircs. 13 
Th<' order<; rcfnsing command approval for respondents' peti-
tioning or lpafletting flowC'd from th0 obviously bias('(] official 
.iurlcr,rncnt that the content w~s "erroneons and misleading 
<'Ommcntnry,'' App., at 34. No. 78-.509, or that it "impugn r Pell 
bv innuPrnlo tlw motives and ronclnrt" of the PrPsident, Apn., 
at 46. Xo. 78-.509. Far from being evenhanclccl regulation, 
12 The regulationR 1wrmit commnnding officers to restrain prtitioning 
nrtivities off-bnsr in foreign countri e~. 
1 '1 While the rcRpondrnts in the~r rn~<'" mOlrnt a facial c}rnll;'.!!,Sr to 1hr 
militn.ry regulations, an appreciation of the thcorrticaTctanger~ 11o~ed by 
the regulations iH brst gained hy con~ickring their operation in pract icr. 
I I ) " , .... 
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this sort of command judgment is quintessentially political; 
in suppressing communication thnt "impugns" Prer-idrntial 
conduct "b:v innucnrlo.'' miliinr:v authorities entangle them-
selves in national politics. Riner thesr cas0s involve discrimi-
natory rcg11lation of cornmunication, Greer's assum11tio11 of 
military nrutrality-and. consrqurntly, Greer's result- can-
not govern here. Actually, thr "trndition of a politically nrt1-
tral military." Greer, s117)ra, a! 8~0. strongly counsrls invali-
dation of thrsC' re,i:i: ulations. whirh drmonstrably encomage 
commanding officrrs to rxf'rcisr perRona l political .iucl)'!rnrnt in 
deciding whether to permit pctitioning;. 14 
Today's decisions, then. clm:h, rathrr than comport. with 
the underlyinv. premises of Creer v. Spock. The Court l!lll1<'C-
cs:aarily trammels important First Am0ndment rights b:v 
nncritica.Jl:v accepting thr clnhious propo-;ition that militnry 
security rrquires- or is fnrthrrrd- by the discretio1rnry s1rn-
prrssion of a classic form of peaceful group rxpression. Serv-
icemen and women de<srn-e brtter than this. I resncctfnlly 
dis~0n t. 
11 Indrrd, inn~much fl~ rr;rnl:l tion~ s1:itr thfl t dis1ribution or po~1ing or 
pr!ition,-; or othrr writing~ '·mn~· not br Jlrohibi1rd solely on 1hr grmmd 
tlrni thr rna1rrial if' rriticfll of C:o\·rrnmrnt polirirs or official,-," AFR 
:35-1.5 (3) (a) ( cmphasi~ addrcl), 1 Ii(• implication is that prohibition mn~· hr 
par1ly hflFrd upon the> foci 1 hn t 1 hr rn:11 rrial in qnrRtion challrngr,: gO\·-
rrnment polic? or officials . 
Furt hrr, n t len~t one cornm:111d rrRJJOnRr to fl prtit ioning rrque;:t indir:\ir;: 
tlrnt thr officer in rlrnrgr ron,:ickrrd hi~ rrnRoring function to imlmlr 1hr 
duty 1o "nfford proprr guidanrr to tlir men undN my commnnd," A11p., nt 
4G-47, No. 78-599. 
1 
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Albert Edward Glines, · , 
" 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves challenges to United States Air Force 
regulations that require members of the service to obtain ap-
proval from their commanders before circulating petitions on 
Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations 
violate the First Amendment. The second question is 
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions 
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which 
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to 
communicate with a Member of Congress. 
I 
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force person-
nel have the right to petition Members of Congress and other 
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (!:}) (1971). The regu-
lations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force 
facility " and "any ·[Air Force] member ... in uniform or . .. 
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition 
without first obtaining authorization from the appr?priate / 
commander. lbid.1 They also provide that "[n]o membe1/ 
1 Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) provides: 
"Righi of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and 
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written 
material ... within any Air Force installation without per-
mission of the commander .... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only 
if he determines that distribution of the material would re-
sult in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale 
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with/ 
the accomplishment of a military mission ... ," Id., 35-
15 (3) (a) (2).2 
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials . However, 
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a, petition within an Air 
Fore<· l'Hc1lit~· or by a memb<'r when in uniform or when in a foreign 
_,__ __ co ... u_try i:; prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." 
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides: 
" (1) No member of the Air Force will distribute or po:;t any printed 
or written material other than publications of an official government 
agrney or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation with-
out permis::;ion of the commander or hi;, desig11f:'e. A copy of the ma-
tPl'ial with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be 
;,ubmitted when permi:;::;ion is requested. Distribution of publications and 
other materials through the United State;; mail or through official outlets, 
such ns military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this 
rrgul:1 tion. 
" (2) When prior approval for distribution or posting ir,; rrquir-ed, the 
commander will determine if Lt clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or 
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with 
the arcomplishment of a military mi::;sion, would result. If such a deter-
mina1 ion is made , d1::;tribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ 
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances. 
" (3) Mere possession of materials unauthorized for distribution or post-
ing may not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such 
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes 
or push; or attempt8 to distribute or post such material within the instal-
lation. Impounded materials will be returned to the owner when depart-
ing the in;;tallation unless determined to be evidence of tL crime. 
" (4 ) Di;,tribution or posting may not bf prohibited ;;olely on the groun~ 
that the material is critical of Government policies or officials. 
" ( 5) In general, im,tallation commanders ~hould encourage au<l promote 
the availability to :;ervice per~onnel of books, periodicab, and other media 
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public iH;;ues." 
~~ $,-.~S,~~ 
..-.?--"'<;. >0-1 (,,,,) O,,) (r,,n), 
C-rr--fa..1-i--~ S LA.-(? ,9 /2;z.""' -h ~;;;z_ce, ~ 
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air :Force Reserves. 
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress 
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air 
Force's grooming standards.3 Aware that he needed com-
mand approval in order to solicit signatures within a base, 
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. Dur-
ing a routine training flight through the An<lerson Air Force 
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air 
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base com-
mander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before mili-
tary authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines' 
commander promptly removed him from active duty, deter-
mined that he had failed to meet the professional standards 
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby re-
serves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that 
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the 
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and ~ 
10 U. S. C. § 1034.1 The court granted Glines' motion for/ 
summary judgment and declared the regulations facially in-
valid. 401 F . Supp. 127 (1975).5 
8 The petition to the Secretary of Deferne, for example, read: 
"Dear Secretary of Defense: 
"We, the undersigned, all American citizen" serving in the Armed Serv-
ices of our nation, request your as~istance in changing the grooming stand-
ards of the United States Air Force. 
"We feel that the present regulations on grooming have caused more 
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for 
authority than any other official Air li'orce policy. 
«·we are 8imilarly petitioning Senator Cranston, Seuator Tunney, Senator 
Jackson, and Congrc~sman Moss in the hopP- that one of om elected or 
appointed ofliciab will hrlp correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F. 
2d 675,677, n. l (CA91978) . / 
1 4 Gliue~ named a~ defenda11t<l three of his superior officer~, the Secretary 
' of the Air Forcr, and the Secretary of Dcfrn~c. 
5 The District Court also awarded Gliues bnckpay and ordered him 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Fol-
lowing its decision in an earlier case involving collective peti-
tions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that 
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034.7 The statute 
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's com-
munication with Congress "unless the communication is un-
lawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of 
the United States." The Air Force regulations against 
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the stat-
utory standard, the court concluded, because the Government 
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam 
were necessary to the national security. Id., at 679. Since 
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of De-
fense, the court next considered whether the regulations vio-
lated the First Amelldment. The court acknowledged that 
:equirer~1e:1ts of n:ili~ary discipline could justify otherwise .~ 
1mpenmss1ble restnct10ns on speech. It held, however, that/ 
the Air Force regulations are ui1constitutionally overbroad 
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually 
Court of Appeal:; aff. rmrd thr rein8tatrment order, but it vacatrd the 
backpay award on the grourid that all monrtary claims against the United 
States for more than $10,000 are witbin the exclusive juri~diction of the 
Court of Claims. 586 F . 2d, at 681-682. Neither is~ue 1s before this 
Court. 
6 The Co11rt of Appeals held that Glines was not requirc•d to exhaust 
his admini8trative remedie8 by Hreking relief from t11e Air Force Board 
for t,l1c Correci ion of 'lVIilita·ry Records. The court found t h1i1 Gline8' claim 
involved statntor~, and com,titutional matters over which the Board had 
no jurisdiction . id., at 678. Smee the petitiO!lers expres8ly declined to 
raise the exha118tion issue in this Court , Pet. for Cert. 6, n. 2, error iu the 
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jmisdiction. 
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) . 
cert. pending sub norn. Brown v. Allen, No. 78-1005. 
7 The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of thi~ i8sue ap1/)ear. 
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all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such re-
strictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to 
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 
- U.S. - (1978), and we now reverse. 
II 
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JusncE 
STEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitu-
tion ... disables a military commander from acting to avert 
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." 
In that case. civilians who wished to distribute political lit-
erature on a military base challenged an Army regulation 
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at 
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that 
the Army regulation was an unconstitutioual prior restraint 
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized 
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of mate-
rial that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness 
of his troops. ee id., at 837-839. We therefore sustained 
the Army regulation. Id., at 840~For the same reasons, we W' 
now uphold the Air Force regulations. 
These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, pro. 
tect a substantial government interest unrelated to the sup-/ 
pression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a 
specialized society separate from civilian society.'' Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must 
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. 
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing 
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services · 
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without 
counterpart in civilian life." SchleS'inger v. Councilma:n, 420 
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-868 (1976). 
Id:_- <{; ________ ,_ ______ _ 
~Hines -A.Jo. 7~-/oD6 - L, -F- /!. 
rn to end of next to last sentence on p.5 
,:Z. We specifically emphasized that the Army requlation at 
issue in 6reer · v:-Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize ------------
the [base] authorities to prohibit the distribution of 
conventional campaiqn literature." Thus, 
our decision to sustain that requlation was distinct from our 
concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that prevented 
civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expression 
't 
of political views, id., at 838-39. 
A 
See id., at 841 (Burqer, ~-
C • J., 
,-J., -a-f 
concurring), l848t9 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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"'Speech that is protected iu the civil populatio11 111ay ..• 
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.'" 
Parker v. Levu, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest, 
21 U. R. C. M. A. 5G4. 570. 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972). 
Thus. while members of the military services are entitled to 
the protections of the First Amenclment, "th0 cliffercnt char-
acter of the military community and the rnilitary mission re-
quires a differeut application of those protections." Parker 
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield 
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline 
and duty .... ' ,, Id., at 744. quoting Bvs V. Wilson, 346 
U.S. 137, 140 (H)53) (plurality opinion). Rpeech likely to- q 
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effective-
ness therefor0 can be excluded from a military base. Spock, 
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., 
at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the 
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reason-
ably 110cessary to protect the substantial governmental in-
terest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Armyv,{' 
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set fort!1
1 
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969):V..., IO 
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's 
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible, 
consistent with good order and discipline and the national se-
curity." Id., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services 
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of 
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to mili-
tary loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
q Afsl'c Em<'r,-011, Towarrl n, C('ncral 'Throry of 1hr First Amcllclment, 72 
Yale L. J. 877, 9:35-936 (HJa6); Tnrell, Petitioning Activitie~ on Military 
Bast's: The Fm,t Amendment Battle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5-14/ 
(1979) . 
10 -'The Nav? regulation:; ndopt<'d pur ·unnt lo Depnrtmcnt of Defense 
(DOD) Directive 1325.G (1960) arr at issue in Secretary of the Navy v, 
Huff, No. 78-599, which we also decide toqay. 
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(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-10, TT 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir. 
1325.6, TT III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifi-
cally prevent commanders from halting the distribution of ma-
terials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air 
Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) ( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 TT III (A) 
(3). Under the regulatious, Air Force commanders have no 
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines 
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post ex-
change newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1); see 
DOD Dir. 1325.6, TT III (A)(l)Y Nor may they interfere I 1 
with the "L d] istribution of publications and other materials 
through the United States mail. ... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 
(3) (a)(l). The Air Force regulations also require any com-
mander who prevents the circulatiou of materials within his 
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Force Reg. 
35-15 (3) (a) (2); see Army Reg. 210-10, TT 5-5 (d). Spock 
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military 
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840; 
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members ~ 
of the military services to secure command approval before~ 
circulating written materials within a military .base is not 
~ ,:i-invalid on its face , Id., at 840. Without the opportunity to 
J\ ...a.-e The Army regulatiol1s allowed a commande,r to delay, and the Depart-
ment of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a milita.ry base of 
pnrticuhr issnes of a commercial p11blication. Arri).y Reg. 210-10, ir 5-5 
' (c), (d) (1970). That part of the Anny regulations waH not at issue i1/ 
,. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 818,832, n . 2 (1976) . The¥-ir :ForC'e regulations 
contain no such provision. , 
11- n Glines would di,;tinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in 
t,hat ca,;e were civilians who had uo specific: righ1 to entPr ti military base. 
The distinction is unpersuasive. Our decision in Spock rejec1 ed a facial 
challenge to a regulation that required "any person," civilian or military, 
to obtain ririor permiH~ion for the distribution of Iiteratme within a base. 
Id. , at 831. Unauthorized distributions of literature by military person-
nel are just as likely to undermine discipliue and morale a,, similar dis~ 
'· 
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review materials before they are dispersed throughout his 
base, a military conunander could not avert possible disrup-
ti01is among his troops. Since a commander is charged with 
rnaintaini11g morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have 
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect 
adversely these essential attributes of an effective militar~ , 'l~ .....-
force~ "fT]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command? 
depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability 
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of sub-
ordinates depends upon the unquestioned st)ecific and custom-
ary reliability of the superior." Departrnent of the Air Force 
Y. Rose, 425 P . , . . , at 368. Because the right to command 
tributious by !'iv1lian~. Furthrrmorr, tlw military ha~ grra1(' r authority 
ovrr n :srrv1rrman th:111 ov<' r :1 <'ivilinn . Src Parker v. Levy , 417 1T. S. 7:33, 
749- 751 (197-l) . Evrn whrn not ronfrontrd with 1hr ,;prrial rrquirrmrnts 
of the militar~·, wr have held that a governmental rmplo)·<'r ma~· 811bject 
it,- rmployc'e8 to ,;ueh s11eeial rr8triction8 on frer expre8~ion as are rra::;on-
al.Jly nect-i;~ar? to promote pffrrtive government. See Civil Setvice C'omm'n 
v. Letter Carriers . 41 :3 U. S. 548, 565 (1!)73) ; Cole v. Richardson, 405 
tT . S. 676, 684 (HJ72) ; rf. KPlley v. Johnson , 425 U. S. 238, '.2-J.5- 248 (1976) . 
( '?, ~'hr ,-perial dangN~ prrse11t in rertain militar)· "'tuationH may warrant 
diffrrrnt rr,;tri et10ni;: on thr right~ of Hcrvicemrn. Bu1 tho~r rrstrirtion:=: 
nere~:=,ary for the m<'ulcat1011 and maintrnnnce.of ba,:1c dbciplinc iwd prc-
parrdne;:;s are u~ JUHtifird 011 a rrg11lar lxisr in 1:11e United Stail>s, Schnefrle1' 
v. Laird, 45;~ F . 2rl 345 (CA!O) (per C'Uriam), cert .. denied , 407 U.S. 914 
(1972) ; Dash v. Com111a11di11g Geueral, 307 F . Supp. 849 (SC HJ69), 
aff 'd, 429 F. 2d 427 (CM 1!)70) (per cwiam) , cert . demed, 401 U. S. 981 
(1971), a:=, on a traimng ba;-;r, Greer , . Spock. supra. or a combat-ready 
im,tallation in the Pac1fir, Carlson v. Schlesinr1er, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 
825, 511 F . 2d 1:327 (1975) . Lo)·tdty, morale, and di;:;c1pl11w are C8seutial 
attribut eH of all military Hervice. Combat 8ervicc obviously rrquire;; thrm. 
And membr r;; of thr armrd "rrvicr;;, whrrever they are as,ng11Pd, may be 
transfrrrpd to !'Omhat cl11t~· Of <·a]Jrd to dra] with civil cl1,-,or(!Pr Or naturav 
d1;;a8ter. Smre thr prior approval rrquiremcnt ,.:upport,.: <'Ommandrr~' 
authorit~· to maintam ba~ir cli;;c1pline requirrcl a1 11ear!y Pv<'r.,· military 
1m,tallat10n, it doe8 not offrnd the Fir;:;t Amendmrnt. "Tiu::; Comt 
has . . repeatrdl~· rxprPs~rd it;.: rrl11ctanre to 1:>trikc· down a statute 011 its 
fare where tlwre fare] ,t :-mb1:,tantial number of H1tuations to which it 
~mght he validly applied " Parker v. Levy, supra, ,Lt 760. 
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and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this 
Court long ago. recognized that the military must possess 
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g., 
Schlesinger v. Counc'ilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re 
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial 
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander 
to determine before distribution whether particular ma-
terials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops>/ I if 
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in pur-
pose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock. 
We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First 
Amendment. 
II 
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C. 
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command 
approval for the circulation within a military base of petition/ 
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "l_n]o person 
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicat-
ing with a member of Congress, unless the communication is 
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of 
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends 
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions 
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We 
find his contention unpersuasive. 
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in re-
sponse to a specific and limited problem. While CongTess 
I t-t' ;Ml"'Commanders sometimes may apply the8e regulations '·irrationally, in-
vidiom,ly, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the 
First Amendment. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S., at 840 But Gline,;, who-
like the civilian8 in Spock-never requested permis,;ion to circulate his 
,__m_ atena 8, ms not an cannot . id., at 849 
(POWELL, J,, COllClll'fing) . 
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was debating the Act, Congressn1ai1 Byrnes of Wisconsin 
learned that a young constitue11t seeking a hardship discharge 
· from the Navy '.'had been told ·by his commanding officer ..• 
that. a . direc t ·cb1ni11unication . with his Congressman was 
.· prohibited and. {that] . it would . make him subject to court-
inartilil:':' 97 Cpng: ·Rec. 3.776 (1951}. When the Congress-
. tf1a1r , inad~ . i~1quiry about the regulations imposing this 
· ... · _: t.~str:iet,ion, · the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they . '· < .· .. ·. '·_, .- ... r.~:qµir~.d.·\i,ai~y ·i~tter·from a member of the naval service , , • 
· · ·· · · - · <: :J<;\,a· Coi1gressu!an \\'.hich· ~~ects ·the Naval Es~atyshrnent ..• 
11 · :f.to] be· sent through official channels." Ibid. The Con-
gressman then proposed an amendment to the pending mili-
tary legislation that would outlaw this requirement. / 
. ~ongressman. Byrnes' purpose was "t~, permit any man w:10 
1s m:~ucted to sit clown and take a pen~1l a;.1d paper ~lld wr~te 
to his Congressman or Senator." Ibid>" T4e entire leg1s- ?; 
lative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue 
for the communication of ind,ividual grievances. The Chair-
lb ,.a.+""l'lw relevnnt Navy regulation actually im110;1C'd restrictions on ''ra]II 
pet.itionf', remonstrances, memorials and cmmmmicntions from any person 
or per~orn, in the naval SC'rvice . . . . " Navy Regs .. a.rt .. 1248 (1948). 
Gline::; argues ihat Congress intrnded to remove all ret:itrictions imposC'd by 
the regulation, including thosr on collective as well as individual petition-
ing . But the plain lnnguage of § 1034 reflrds no such intention. Indeed, 
nothing in the legi::;lativr history suggests t.hat Congre::;s even was aware 
of thr full scopr of the Nav)· regulation . 
lb .;1,5 The original proposal protC'cted any per::i0l1 from induction into ·v 
bra.nch of the armed forces that rC'stricted the " rights of it,- mC'mbers to 
communicate direct!)' with Member,; of Congres,; . . .. " 97 Cong. Rec .· 
3776 (1951) . After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
pointed out. that t.he Navr did not induct its members, ibid., the proposa · 
waR amended to subst.antin ll)' its present. form, icl., at 3877, 3883. Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144, 
§ 1 ( d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent. minor revision,; when codified 
in 1956. Act of Aug. 10. 1956, Pnb. L. 102Es, ch. 1041, 70A St,,t. 80. No 
change in substame was inteuded. See S. R,ep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2cl 
Sess. , 95-96, 19-21 (1956) ; H . R . Rep . No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,. 
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man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized 
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was 
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the 
privilege o'f writing his Congressman or Senator on any sub-
ject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with 
some secret matter." Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that 
Coi1gress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual mem-
·ber of the armed services could write to his elected represen-
. tatives without sending his communication through official 11 
channels~ 
Both Congress and this Court have fom1d that the special 
character of the military requires civilian authorities to ac-
cord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with 
matters that affect internal discipline a11d morale. See, e. g., 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at 
49-51 (PowELL, J. , concurring); Parker "· Levy, 417 U. S. 
6 
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-9~ (/ 
(1953)~ In construing a statute that touches on such matters~ 
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the au-
thority of military commanders to an extent never intended 
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. 
D. C. ·26, -, 57.5 F. 2d 907-, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., con-
curring in part and dissenti1ig in part), rev'd, No. 78-599. 
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to 
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves 
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endan-
gering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good 
11 --Section 1034 stands in marked contra:;t to an analogou~ ~tatute en-
acted about, 40 yearn earlier in order to guarantee frderal civil i,ervants 
the right to petition Congrrss . That statute provides : "The right of 
employees, incl-ividually or collectively, to petition Congre~~ or a Mem-
ber of Congfess, or to furnish information to either House of Congres:;, or 
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered wit,h or denied." 
5 U. S. C. § 7211. (Empha:,ii, added.) 
( 'o _.See also Curry v. Sec;.retary of the Anny, - U. S. App. D ." C. - 1 
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order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of col-
lective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legisla-
tiv~ p~rp~se that requires _the military to assume this r~ and 
no md1cat10n that Congre,ss contemplated such a result. We /°I 
therefore decide_ that § 1034.does not protect the circulation of 
. colJ~ctive p~titions withiri a military base. 
.. ~ ... ' . IV 
· · W~-co1-iclude .. that ·neither the First Amendment nor 10 
U. S. C. § 1034 'preve~ts the Air Force from requiring mem-
bers of the service to -secure approval from the base com/ 
mander before distributing petitions within a military base . . 
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are 
not invalid on their face. Accorqingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is 
/'f ~Glines say:; DOD Dir. 1325.6, UII (G) shows that the Department 
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, how-
ever, add:; nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history. 
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10 
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed force:;] to 
complain and request redretJs of grievances again:;t, actions of their com-
mander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 1034 for the statement that "a 
member may petition or pre8ent any grievance to any member of Con-
gress .... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D . C. 26, 
-, 575 F. 2d 907, 913 (1978), rev'd, No. 78-599, the court concluded 
that this reference to § 1034 imvlied approval of group petitioning. But 
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demon-
strate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directive-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
rrhis case involves challenges to Uniwd States Air Force 
regulations that require members of the service to obtain ap-
proval from their commanders before circulating petition:S on 
Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations 
violate the First Amendment. The second question is 
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions 
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which 
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to 
communicate with a Member of Congress. 
J[ 
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force person-
nel have the right to petition Metnbers of Congress and other 
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) . The regu-
lations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force 
facility" and "any 1[Air Force] member . .. in uniform or . •• 
in a foreign country" from ·soliciting signatures on a petition 
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate 
commander. lbid.1 They also provide that "[n]o member 
1 Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) provides: 
"Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and 
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written 
material ... within any Air Force installation without per-
mission of the commander .... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only 
if he determines that distribution of the material would re-
sult in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale 
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mission .... " Id., 35-
15 (3) (a) (2).2 
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However, 
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a petition within an Air 
Force facility or by a member ·when in uniform or when in a foreign 
country is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." This I 
regnlation has been super:seded by Air Force Reg. 30-1 (19) (b) (1977), 
which contains substantially the same provisions. 
2 Air Force Reg. 35...;15 (3) (a) (1970) provides: 
" (1) No member of tl1e Air Force will distribute or post any printed 
or written material other than publications of an official government 
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation with-
out permission of the commander or his designee. A copy of the ma-
terial with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be 
submitted when permission is requested. Distribution of publications and 
other materials through t11e · United States mail or through official outlets, 
such a,; military libraries and exchanges, may ·not be prohibited under this 
regulation . 
" (2) When prior approval for di::;tribution or posting is required, the 
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or 
morale of members of the Armed "Forces , or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mission, would result. If such a deter-
mination is made, distribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ 
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances. 
" (3) Mere possession of materials unauthorized for distribution or post-
ing mny not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such 
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes 
or post:, or attempts to distribute or post such material within the instal-
lation. Impounded materials will be retumed to the owner when depart-
ing the installation unless determined to be evidence of a crime. 
" ( 4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the grouµd 
·that the material is critical of Government policies or officials. 
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves, 
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress 
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air 
Force's grooming standards.8 Aware that he needed com-
mand approval in order to solicit signatures within a base, 
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. Dur-
ing a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force 
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air 
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base com-
mander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before mili-
tary authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines1 
commander promptly removed him from active duty, deter-
mined that he had failed to meet the professional standards 
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby re-
serves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that 
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approv11l for the 
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and 
10 U. S. C. § 1034.4 The court granted Glines' motion for 
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media 
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public issues." 
8 The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read: 
"Dear Secretary of Defense: 
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Serv-
ices of our nation, request your assistance in changing the grooming stand-
ards of the United States Air Force. 
"We feel that the pre::1ent regulations on grooming have caused more 
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for 
authority than any other official Air Force policy. 
"We are similarly petitioning Senator Cran:;ton, Senator Tunney, Senator 
Jackson, and Congre,;sman Moss in the hope that one of our elected or 
appointed officials will help correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F . 
2d 675,677, n. 1 (CA9 1978). 
4 Glines named a::1 defendants three of his superior officer::,, the Secretary 
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summary judgment and declared the regulations facially in• 
valid. 401 .F. Supp. 127 (1975).6 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Fol-
lowing its decision in an earlier case involving collective peti-
tions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that 
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034.7 The statute 
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's com-
munication with Congress "unless the communication is un-
lawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of 
the United States." The Air Force regulations against 
unauthorized petitioning on any ·base did not satisfy the stat-
utory standard, the court concluded, because the Government 
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam 
were necessary t? the national security. Jd., at 679. Since 
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the ·secretary of De-
fense, the court pext considered whether the regulations vio-
lated the First Amendment. · The court acknowledged that 
requirements of military discipline could justify otherwise 
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that 
5 The District Court also awarded Glines backpay and ordered him 
restored to active service. 401 F. Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The 
Court of Appeals aff.rmed the rein8tatement order, but it vacated the 
· backpay award on the ground that all monetary claims against the United 
States for more than $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court of Claims. 586 F . 2d, at 681-682. Neither issue is before this 
' Court. 
6 The Court of Appeals held that, Glines was not required to exhaust 
his admini8trative remedies by seeking relief from the Air Force Board 
for the Correction of Military"Tiecords. The court found that Glines' claim 
involved statutory and constitutional matters over which the Board had 
no jurisdiction. Id. , at 678. Smee the petitioners expressly declined to 
raise the exhaustion issue in this Court, Pet. for Cert. 6, 11. 2, error in the 
' Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jurisdiction. 
' Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) . 
7 The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of this issue appear 
in its opinion in Allen v. Mongei·, 583 .F. 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978),. 
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the Air Force regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad 
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually 
all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such re-
strictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to 
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 
- U.S. - (1978), and we now reverse. 
II 
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JusTICE 
STEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitu,. 
tion ... disables a military commander from acting to avert 
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." 
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political lit-
erature on a military base cha1lenged an Army regulation 
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at 
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that 
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint 
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized 
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of mate-
rial that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness 
of his troops. See id., at '837-839. We therefore sustained 
the Army regulation. Id., at 840.8 For the same reasons, we 
now uphold the Air Force regulations. 
These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, pro-
tect a substantial government interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a 
8 We specifically emphasized that the Army regulation at issue in Gree!' 
v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize the [base] authorities 
. to prohibit the di::itribution of conventional campaign literature." Id., at 
840, 831, n . 2. Thu,-, om decision to HUHtain that reg-ulation Wai< distinct 
from our concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that, prevented 
civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expres:sion of 
political views, id., at 838-839. See id., at 841 (BuRuER, C. J., concur-
ring) ; id., UL c 48-849 (POWELL, J., COllC'Urring)'. 
0 
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specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must 
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. 
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing 
their mission promptly and reliably, the military serviceg 
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without 
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-368 (l976). 
" 'Speech that is protected in the civil population may ... 
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.''' 
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting· United States v. Priest, 
21 U. S. C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972). 
Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment, "the different char-
acter of the military community and the military mission re-
quires a different application of those protections." Parker 
v. Levy, supra, at 758. "The rights of military men must yield 
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline 
and duty .... '" Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 
U. S. 137, 140 (1953) ( plurality opinion) .0 Speech likely to 
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effective-
ness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock, 
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring) ; id., 
at 848 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the 
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reason-
ably necessary to protect the substantial governmental in-
terest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army 
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set forth 
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) .10 
9 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
Yale L. J. 877, 935-936 (1936); Terrell, Petitioning Activities on Military 
Bases: The First Amendment Battle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5-14 
(1979). 
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That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's 
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible, 
consistent with good order and discipline and the national se-
curity." ld., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services 
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of 
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to mili-
tary loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-10, ~ 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir. 
1325.6, ,r III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifi-
cally prevent commanders from halting the distribution of ma-
terials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air 
Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) ( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 ,r III (A) 
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no 
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines 
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post ex-
change newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(l); see 
DOD Dir. 1325.6. ~-III (A)(l). 11 Nor may they interfere 
with the " [ d] istribution of publications and other materials 
through the United States mail. ... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 
(3) (a)(l). The Air Force regulations also require any com-
mander who prevents the circulation of materials within his 
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Foree Reg. 
35-15 (3)(a)(2); see Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (d). Spock 
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military 
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U.S., at 840; 
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members 
of the military services I to secure command approval before 
(DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v. 
Huff, No. 78-599, which we also decide today. 
11 The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Depart-
ment of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of 
particular issues of a commercial publication. Army Reg. 210--10, ,r 5-S 
(c), (d) (1970). That part of the Army regulations was not at issue in 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,832, n. 2 (1976.) .. The Air Force regulations; 
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circulating written materials within a military base is not 
invalid on its face. Id., at 840.12 Without the opportunity to 
review materials before they are dispersed throughout his 
base, a military commander could not avert possible disrup~ 
tions among his troops. Since a commander is charged with 
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have 
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect 
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military 
force. 13 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command 
u Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in 
that case were civifoms who· had no specific right to enter a military base. 
The distinction is unpersuasive. Our deci~ion in Spock rejected a facial 
challenge to a regulation that required "any person ," civilian or military, 
to obtniu prior permi:;sion for the distribution of literature within a base. 
Id., at 831. Unauthorized distribution,; of li1erature by military person-
nel are just as like1y to undermine discipline and morale as similar dis-
tributions Ly civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority 
over a serviceman than over a civilian. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
749~751 (1974) . Even when not, confront,ed with the special requirements 
of the military, we have held tha1 a governmental employer may subject 
its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reason-
ably nece;,sary to promote effective government. See Civil Service Comm'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405 
U.S. 676,684 (1972); cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-248 (1976). 
13 The special dangers present in certain military situations may warrant 
different restrictions on the rights of servicemen. But those restrictions 
necessary for the inculcation and maintenance of basic discipline and pre-
paredness are as justified on a regular base in the United States, Schneider 
v. Laird, 453 F. 2d 345 (CAlO) (per curiam), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 
(1972); Dash v. Commanding Geneml, 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969), 
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 
(1971), as on a training base, Greer v. Spock, supra, or a combat-ready 
installation ill the Pacific, Carlson v. Schlesinger, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 
325, 511 F . 2d 1327 (1975) . Loyalty, morale, and di8cipline are essential 
attributrs of all military service. Combat service obviously requires them. 
And members of the armed services, wherever they are assigned, may be 
transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil disorder or na.tural 
disaster. Since the prior approval requirement supports commander::;' 
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depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability 
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of sub-
ordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and custom-
ary reliability of the superior." Department of the Air Force 
v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 368. Because the right to command 
and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this 
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess 
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g., 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re 
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial 
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander 
to determine before distribution whether particular ma-
terials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops.14 
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in pur-
pose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock. 
We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First 
Amendment. 
II 
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C. 
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command 
approval for the circulation within a military base of petitions 
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "[n]o person 
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicat-
installation, il does not offend the First Amendment. "This Court 
has ... repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its 
face where there [are] a :substantial number of i:iituations to which it 
might be validly applied." Parker v. Levy, supra, at 760. 
11 Commanders sometimes may apply these regulations "irrationally, in-
vidiom,ly, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the 
Fir~t Amendment. Gre1.>r v. Spock, 424 U.S., at 840; see Secretary of the·\ 
Navy v. Huff, No. 78-599, at 5, n. 5. But Glines, who-like the civilians 
in Spock-never requested permission to circulate his materials, has not. 
and cannot raise such a claim. Greer v. Spock, supra, at 840; id., at 8491 
(PowELL, J .. , concurring). 
10 
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ing with a member of Congress, unless the communication is 
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of 
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends 
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions 
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We 
find his contention unpersuasive. 
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in re-
sponse to a specific and limited problem. While Congress 
was debating the Act, Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin 
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge 
from the Navy "had been told by his commanding officer ... 
that a direct communication with his Congressman was 
prohibited and [that] it would make him subject to court-
martial.2' 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). When the Congress-
man made inquiry about the regulations imposing this 
restriction, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they 
required "any letter from a member of the naval service .. . 
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment .. . 
[tol be sent through official channels." Ibid.'" The Con-
gressman then proposed an amendment to the pending mili-
tary legislation that would outlaw this requirement. 
Congressman Byrnesi purpose was "to permit any man who 
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write 
to his Congressman or Senator." Ibid.rn The entire legis-
1 " The rrl<'vani Nav)' regulation nctually impos1'd restrictions on "fa]ll 
petitions, remonstrances, memorials and communications from any person 
or persons in the naval service .... " Nnvy Regs., art. 1248 (1948). 
Glines argues that Congress intended to remove all restriction~ imposed by 
the regulation, including those on collectivr as well as individual petition-
ing. But the plain language of § 1034 rpflects no such intention. Indeed, 
nothing m the Jegii,;lativc history suggests that Congre,;s even was aware 
of the full scope of the Navy regulation. 
16 The original proposal protect Pd any pert,on from induct ion into a 
branch of the armed forces that restricted the "rights of its members to 
communicate directly with Member;; of Congress .... " 97 Cong. Rec. 
3776 (1951). After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
78-1006-0PINION 
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lative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue 
for the communication of individual grievances. The Chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized 
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, ·was 
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the, 
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any sub-
ject if it does not violate the 1aw or if it does not deal with 
some secret matter." Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that 
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that au individual mem-
ber of the armed services could write to his elected represen-
tatives without sending his communication through official 
channels.17 
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special 
character of the military requires civilian authorities to ac-
cord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with 
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g., 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at 
49-51 (PowELL, J., concurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 
(1953).18 In construing a statute that touches on such matters, 
pointed out that the Navy did not induct its members, ibid., the proposal 
was amended to substantially its present form, id., at 3877, 3883. Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144, 
§ 1 (d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified 
in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 80. No 
change in substance was intended. See S. Rep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 95-96, 19-21 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 
85, 8-10 (1955) . 
17 Section 1034 stands in marked contrast to au analogou,; ·tatute en-
acted about 40 yearl:! earlier m order to guarantee federal civil servants 
the right to petition Congress. That statute provides: "The right of 
employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Mem-
ber of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or 
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." 
5 U. S. C. § 7211. (Empha:sii, added.) 
18 See also Curry v Secretary of the Army, - U .. S. App. D . C. -~ 
595 F • .2d 873 ( 1979) • 
12 
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therefore, ,courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the au-
thority of military commanders to an extent never intended 
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. 
D. C. 26, -, 575 F. 2d· 907, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, No. 78-599. 
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to 
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves 
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endan-
gering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good 
order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of col-
lective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legisla-
tive purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and 
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result. 10 We 
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of 
collective petitions within a military base. 
IV 
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10 
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring mem-
bers of the service to secure approval from the base com-
mander before distributing petitions within a military base. 
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are 
19 Gli1ws says DOD Dir. 1325.6, 1III (G) shows that the Department 
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, how• 
ever, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history, 
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10 
U. S. C. § 938, protects the . "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to 
complain and request redress of grievances against actions of their com-
mander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 1034 for the statement that "a 
member may petition or prese11t any grievance to any member of Con-
gress .... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26, 
-, 575 F . 2d 907, 913 (1978) , rev'd, No. 78-599, the court, concluded 
that this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But 
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demon• 
strate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directive 
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not invalid on their face. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFiJ 
No. 78-1006 
Harold R. Brown, Secretary of j O ·w . f C . . h . . n nt o ertioran to t e 
Defense, et al., Petitioners, U . d St C rt f A mte ates ou o p-
p. peals for the Ninth Circuit, 
Albert Edward Glines. 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves challenges ·to United States Air Force 
regulations that require members of the service to obtain ap-
proval from their commanders before circulating petitions on 
Air Force bases. · The first question is·whether the regulations 
violate the First Amendment. The second question iis 
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions 
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which 
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a servicemari's iright to 
communicate with a Member ofrCongress. 
I 
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force person-
nel have the right to petition Members of Congress and other 
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971). The regu-
lations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force 
facility" and "any '[Air Force] member ... in uniform or . .. 
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition 
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate 
commander. lbid.1 They also provide that "[n]o member 
1 Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) provides: 
"Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependent.s and 
civilian employees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to, 
•; 
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written 
material . . , within any Air Force installation without per~ 
mission of the commander .... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only 
if he determines that distribution of the material would re-
sult in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale 
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mission .••. " Id., 35-
15 (3) (a) (2).2 
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However, 
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a petition within an Air 
Force facility or by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign 
country is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." T,his 
regulation hall been superseded by Air Force Reg. 30-1 (19) (b) (1977), 
which contains substantially the same provisions. 
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides: 
"(1) No member of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed 
or written material other than publications of an official government 
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation with-
out permission of the commander or his designee. A copy of the ma-
terial with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be 
submitted when permission is requested. Distribution of publications and 
other materials through the United States mail or through official outlets, 
such as military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this 
regulation. 
"(2) When prior approval for distribution or posting is required, the 
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or 
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with 
the accomplishment of a military mission, would result. If such a deter--
mination is made, distribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ 
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances. 
"(3) Mere possession of ma.terials unauthorized for distribution or post-
ing may not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such 
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes 
or posts or attempts to distribute or post such material within the instal-
lation. Impounded materials will be returned to the owner when depart-
ing the installation unless determined to be evidence of a crime. 
" ( 4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the ground 
that the material is critical of Government policies or officials. 
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves. 
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress 
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air 
F-orce's grooming standards.3 Aware that he needed com- · 
mand approval in order to solicit signatures within a base, 
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. Dur-
ing a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force 
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air 
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base com-
mander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before mili-
tary authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines' 
commander promptly removed hi,:n from active duty, deter-
mined that he had failed to meet the professional standards 
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby re-
serves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that 
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the 
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and 
10 U. S. C. § 1034.4 The court granted Glines' motion for 
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media 
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public issues." 
8 The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read: 
"Dear Secretary of Defense: 
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Serv-
ices of our nation, request your assistance in changing the grooming stand.,, 
ards of the United States Air Force. 
"We feel that the present regulations on grooming have caused more 
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for 
authority than any other official Air Force policy. 
"We are similarly petitioning Senator Cranston, Senator Tunney, Senato~ 
Jackson, and Congressman Moss in the hope that one of our elected OI" 
appointed officials will help correct this problem." ,Glines v. Wade, 586 F ,. 
2d 675, 677, n. 1 (CA9 1978). 
4 Glines named as defendants three of his superior officer8, the Secretary-
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summary judgment and declared the regulations facially in-
valid. 401 F. Supp. 127 (1975) .5 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Fol-
lowing its decision in an earlier case involving collective peti-
tions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that 
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034.7 The statute 
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's com-
munication with Congress "unless the communication is un-
lawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of 
the United States." The Air Force regulations against 
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the stat-
utory standard, the court concluded, because the Government 
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam 
were necessary to the national security. Id., at 679. , Since 
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of De-
fense, the court next considered whether the regulations vio-
lated the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that 
requirements of military discipline could justify otherwise 
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that 
5 The District Court also awarded Glines backpay and ordered him 
restored to active service. 401 F. Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement order, but it vacated the 
backpay award on the ground that all monetary claims against the United 
States for more than $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court of Claims. 586 F. 2d, at 681-682. Neither isi:;ue is before thi~ 
Court. 
6 The Court of Appeals held that Glines was not required to exhaust 
his administrative remedie::; by seeking relief from the Air Force Board 
for the Correction of Military Records. The court found that Glines' claim 
involved statutory and constitutional matters over which the Board had 
no jurisdiction. Id., at 678. Smee the petitioners expressly declined to 
raise the exhaustion issue in this Court, Pet . for Cert . 6, n 2, error in the 
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jurisdiction. 
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 330 (1976). 
7• The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of tliii:; issue appear-· 
in its OlJinion in Allen v. Monge1·, 583 F. 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978) ... 
'cert. pending sub nom. Brown v. Allen, o. 78-1005. 
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the Air Force regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad 
because th~.Y might aJl9w commanders to suppress "virtually 
1tll controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such re-
liltriction~, the court concluded; "exceed anything essential to 
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari, · 
- U, S. - (1978), and we now reverse. 
II 
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JUSTICE 
STEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitu-
tion ... disables a military commander from acting to avert 
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." 
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political lit-
erature on a military base challenged an Army regulation 
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at 
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that 
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint 
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized 
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of mate-
rial that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness 
of his troops. See id., at 837-839. We therefore sustained 
the Army regulation. Id., at 840.8 For the same reasons, we 
now uphold the Air Foree regulations.0 
8 We specifically emphasized that the Army regulation at issue in Greer 
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize the [base] authorities 
to prohibit the distribution of conventional campaign literature." Id., at 
840, 831, n. 2. Thus, our decision to sustain that regulation was distinct 
from our concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that prevented 
civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expression of 
political views, id., at 838-839. See id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concur-
ring); id., at 848-849 (PowELL, ,T., concurring). 
0 Mn. JusncFJ SnwEN's dissenting opinion seems to suggest that we 
should avoid the constitutional issue in this case by applying 10 U. S. C. 
§ 1034 to petitioning activity that the statute otherwise would not pro-
tect. Post, at -. Since Oline::;' petition to the Secretary of Defense 
was not covered by the statute, however, we agree with the Court 01 







BROWN v. GLINES 
These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, pro-
tect a substantial government interest unrel3:ted to the sup-
pression of free expression. 'See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U, S. 396, 413 (1974). The military "is, ('by necessity, a 
specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must 
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. 
Tbid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing 
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services 
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without 
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-368 (1976). 
" 'Speech that is protected in the civil population may . 
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.' " 
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest, 
21 U. S. C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972). 
Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment, "the different char-
acter of the military community and the military mission re-
quires a different application of those protections." Parker 
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield 
somewhat " 'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline 
and duty .... '" Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 
U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion).10 Speech likely to 
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effective-
ness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock, 
Appeals that "[tJhis petition requires us to decide whether the :First I 
Amendment, also protects Clines' activities." 586 F. 2d 675, 679. As the 
Court, of Appeals nnderstood, Glines' petition to the Secretary was it~elf 
a .:sufficient reason for his rea,;:signment to the standby reserves. 
10 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
Yale L. J . 877, 935-936 (1936); Terrell, Petitioning Activities on Military 
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supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., 
a.t 848 (POWELL, J ., concurring). 
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the 
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reason. 
ably necessary to protect the substantial governmental in-
terest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army 
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set forth 
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969). 11 
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's 
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible, 
consistent with good order and discipline and the national se.-
curity.'' ld. , iT II. Thus, the regulations in both services 
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of 
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to mili-
tary loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Foree Reg. 35-15 (3) 
(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-101 TT 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir. 
1325.6, TT III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifi-
cally prevent commanders from halting the distribution of ma-
terials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air 
Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 TT III (A) 
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no 
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines 
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post ex-
change newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(l); see 
DOD Dir. 1325.6, iT III (A) (l).12 Nor may they interfere 
with the "[d]istribution of publications and other materials 
through the United States mail .... " Air Force Reg. 35-15 
11 The Navy regulations adopted pursuant to Department of Defense 
(DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v. 
Huff, No. 78-599, which we also decide today. 
12 The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Depart-
ment of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of 
particular is;;ues of a commercial publication. Army Reg. 21{}-10, ,r 5-5 
(c), (d) (1970). That part of the Army regulations was not at i,;sue in 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 832, n. 2 (1976). The Air Force regulations 
, contain no ·11ch provi:-ion. 
8 
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(3) (a) (1) The Air Force regulations also require any com-
'mander who prevents the circulation of materials within his 
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Foree Reg. 
35-15 (3) (a) (2); see Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (d). Spock 
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military 
base clo not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840; 
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members 
of the military services to secure command approval before 
circulating written materials within a -military base is not 
invalid on its face. Id., at 840.' 3 Without the opportunity to 
review materials before they are dispersed throughout his 
base, a military commander could not avert possible disrup-
tions among his troops. Since a commander is charged with 
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have 
authority over the distribution or -materials that could affect 
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military 
iorce:14 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command 
13 Glines would distingui:sl1 Spocl-.: on !hr ground that the plaintiffs in 
that case were civilians who had· no -specific right to enter a military base. 
The distmction is unpersuasive. Our decision in Spock rejected a facial 
challenge to a regulation that re4uired "any person," civilian or military, 
to obtain prior permission for the distnbution of literature within a base. 
Id., at 831. Unauthorized distributions of literature by military person-
nel are just as likely to undermine discipline and morale as similar dis,-
tributions by civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority 
over a serviceman than over a civilian. See Parke,· v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 
749-751 (1974) . Even when not confronted with the special requirements 
of the military, we have held that a governmental employer may subject 
its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reason-
a.bly necessary to promote effective government. See Civil Service Comm'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 ( 1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405 
U. S. 676,684 (1972) ; cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-248 (1976). 
H The spe<'ial dangers pre,-Pnt in certain military situa1ions ma.y warraJ1t 
different restrictions on the rights of servicemen. But those restrictions 
necessary for the inculcation and maintenance of basic discipline and pre-
paredness are as justified on a regular base in the United States, Schneider 
,. v. 'Laird, 453 F . 2d 345 (CAlO) (per cuiiam) , cert.. denied, 407 lT. S. 914 
'· 
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depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability 
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of sub-
ordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and custom-
ary reliability of the superior." Department of the Air Force 
v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 368. Because the right to command 
and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this 
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess 
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g., 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re 
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial 
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander 
to determine before distribution whether particular ma-
terials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops.15 
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in pur-
pose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock. 
(1972); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969), 
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 
(1971), as on a training base, Greer v. Spock, supra, or a combat-ready 
installation m the Pacific, Carlsan v. Schlesinger, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 
325, 511 F . 2d 1327 (1975). Loyalty, morale, and discipline are essential 
attributes of all military service. Combat service obviously requires them. 
And members of the armed services, wherever they are assigned, may be 
transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil disorder or natural 
disaster. Since the prior approval requirement supports commanders' 
authority to maintain basic discipline required at nearly every military 
installation, it does not offend the First Amendment. "This Court 
has ... repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its 
face where there [ are] a substantial number of situations to which it 
might be validly applied." Parker v. Levy, supra, at 760. 
1 6 Commanders sometime,; may apply the::;e regulations "irrationally, in-
vidiously, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the 
Firtit Amendment. Greer v. Spock. 424 U. S., at 840; see Secretary of the 
Navy v Huff, No. 78-599, at 5, u. 5. But. Glines, who-like the civilians 
in $pock-never requested permission to circulate his materials, has not 
and cannot Tai~e such a claim. Greer " · Spock, supra, at 840; id., at 84~ 
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We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First 
Amendment. 
II 
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C. 
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command" 
approval for the circulatiou within a military base of petitions 
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "[n]o person 
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicat-
ing with a member of Congress, unless the communication is 
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of 
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends 
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions 
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We 
find his contention unpersuasive. 
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in re-
sponse to a specific arid limited problem. While Congress· 
was debating the Act, Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin 
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge-
from the Navy ·"had been told by his commanding officer .•• 
that a direct communication with his Congressman was· 
prohibited and '[that] it would make him subject to court-
martial." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951) . When the Congress-
man made inquiry about the regulations imposing this 
restriction, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they 
required "any letter from a member of the naval service .• _ 
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment .• ., 
'[to] be sent through official channels." lbid.10 The Con-
'i<J The relevan1, Navy rrgula!ion actually imposed restrictions on "[a.]11 
petitions, remonstrances, memorials and communications from any person-
or persons in the naval service .. .. " Navy Regs., art. 1248 (1948) •. 
Glines argues that Congress intended to remove all restrictions imposed by 
the regulation, including tho8e on collective as well as individual petition-
ing. But the plain language of § 1034 reflects no such intention. Indeed, 
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress even was aware--
of the foll scope of the Navy regulation. 
... 
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gressman then proposed an amendment to the pending mili. 
tary legislation that would outlaw this requirement. 
Congressman Byrnes' purpose was "to permit any man who 
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write 
to his Congressman or Senator." lbid. 11 The entire legis-
lative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue 
for the communication of individual grievances. The Chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized 
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was 
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the, 
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any sub-
ject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with 
some secret matter." Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that 
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual mem-
ber of the armed services eould write to his elected represen-
tatives without sending his communication through official 
channels.18 
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special 
17 The original proposal prot,ected any person from induction int.o a 
branch of the armed forces that restricted the "rights of its members to 
communicate directly with Members of Congress .. . . " 97 Cong. Rec, 
3776 (1951) . After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
pointed out that the Navy did not induct its members, ibid., the proposal 
was amended to ·substantially its present form, id., at 3877, 3883. Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144, 
§ 1 (d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified 
in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 80. No 
change in substance was intended. See S. Rep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 95--96, 19-21 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 
85, 8-10 (1955). 
38 Section 1034 stands in marked contrast to an analogous statute en-
acted about 40 years earlier in order to guarantee federal civil servants 
the right to petition Congress. That statute provides: "The right of 
employees, individ'Ually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Mem-
ber of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or 
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied.'t-
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character of the military requires civilian authorities to ac-
cord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with 
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g., 
M iddendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. ·25, 37-40, 43 (1976) ; id., at 
49-51 (POWELL, J ., concurring), Parker V • . Levy, 417 u. s. 
733, 756 (1974) ; Orloff v. 'Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 
(1953).u In construing a statute that touches on such matters, 
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the au-
thority of military commanders to an extent never intended 
by Congress." Huff v~ Secretary of the Navy, -188 U.S. App. 
D. C. 26, - , 575 F. 2d 907, 9f6 (1978) (Tamm, ·J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), rev'il, No. 78-599. 
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to 
submit a petition directly to any' Member of Congress serves 
the legislative purpose of § f034 without unnecessarily endan-
gering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good 
order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of col-
lective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legisla-
tive purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and 
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result.20 We 
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of 
collective petitions within a military base. 
19 See also Cui·ry v. Secretary of the Army, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 
595 F . 2d 873 (1979) . 
20 Glines says DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,rIII (G) shows that the ·Department 
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, how-
ever, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history. 
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10 
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to 
complain and request redress of grievances against actions of their com-
mander." It then cites 10 ·u. S. ·c. § 1034 for the statement that "a 
member may petition or present any grievance to any member of Con-
gress . .. . " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26, 
- , 575 F . 2d ·007, '913 (1978) , rev'd, ·No. -78-599, the court concluded 
· that this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But 
· the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demon-
strate t hat the Department of Defense has construed its own directive 
,. otherwise . . ee supra, at 6-7, and n. 9. 
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13 
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10 
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring mem-
bers of the service to secure approval from the base com-
mander before distributing petitions within a military base. 
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are 
not invalid on their face. Accordingly, the judgment of the 






.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 17, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1006 - Bron v. Glines 
Dear Lewis: 
Please mark me as not participating in 
this opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j,u.µrttttt C!Jirttd l1'f t4t 'Jllnitth j,bdt¼t 
•uJr:ngtit~ lll, <q. 2llffe~$ 
January 17, 1980 
Re: 78-1006 - Brown v. Glines 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your Ja ary 15 draft. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 





•,, .. ' . ' 
... :.., 
. ' ,,, 
, ~ - . JAN l ti 18tiU .. 4 Q~ r h1 
NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syl!al;ms (11eadnate) will be re. 
leased, as Is being done In connection · with this case, at the time 
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detro" Lu-mber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
~ ie proof of syllabus as 
y,pproved. 
J;L Lineup included. 
. still to be 
- Line? Please send 
3:dde . to Print Shop 
lineup ·1 ble and 
I. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
when ava1 a 
a copY to me. f of 
f page proo 




- Lineup, which has now 
been added. 
BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL. v. GLINEf _ Additional changes 
in syllabUS-
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 78-1006. Argued November 6, 1979-Decided January 21, 1980 
Air Force regulations require members of that service to obtain approval 
from their commanders before circulating petitions oil Air Force bases. 
Respondent Air Force Reserve officer was removed from active duty 
for distributing on an Air Force base petitions to Members of Congress 
and the Secretary of Defense, which complained about Air Force groom-
ing standards, without having obtained -approval of the base commander 
as required by the regulations. Respondent then brought suit in Dis-
trict Court challenging the validity of the regulations. That court 
granted summary judgment for respondent, declaring the regulations 
facially invalid, and the Court of Appeals affirfued. _ 
Held: The regulations are not invalid on their face. 'Pp. 5-13. 
(a) Such regula.tions do not violate the. First AII).endment. Greer ·v. 
Spock, 424 U. S. 828. They protect a substantial 
1
Government interest 
unrelated to the suppression of freo ·expression-the interest in main~ 
· taining the respect for duty and discipline so vital to military effec-
tiveness-and restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to 
protect such interest. Since a military commander is cha,rged with 
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have authority 
over the distribution of materials that could affect a.dversely these 
essential attributes of an effective military fdrce. Pp. 5-9. 
(b) Nor do the regulations violate 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which pro~ 
scribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to communicato 
with a Member of Congress. As § 1034's legislative history makes clear, 
1Congress enacted the statute to ensure that an individual member of 
the Armed Services could write to his elected representatives without 
sending his communication through official channels, and not to protect 
'the circulation of collective petitions within a military base. Permitting 
an individual serviceman to submit a petition directly to any Member 
'of Congress serves § 1034's legislative purpose without unnecessarily 
l 
T~ y c. LIND 
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endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good order 
among his troops. Pp. 9-12. 
586 F. 2d 675, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
WHrrE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. S'l'EWART, J., filed a dissenting opiniou, in which 
BRENNAN, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. MARSHALL, 
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
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